Budgeting and Acquisition Business Process Reform by McCaffery, Jerry & Jones, Lawrence
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2007-11-01










Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
 









Budgeting and Acquisition Business Process Reform 
07 November 2007 
by 
Dr. Lawrence R. Jones, Professor, and 
Dr. Jerry L. McCaffery, Professor 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 

















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
e-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
This report serves three purposes. Our first purpose is to assess the future of 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) and related 
budget reforms and to suggest that it may take more that a marginal adjustment to 
the current PPBES process to plan and budget most effectively for national defense 
and weapons acquisition. In this regard, we recommend that the DOD, and the 
federal government as a whole, adopt a capital budgeting process. The second 
purpose is to review and assess previous acquisition reforms in DOD, many of which 
continue into the present. The third purpose is to assess modification of the current 
acquisition process to improve the business processes imbedded within this system, 
as well as to make the overall process operate more efficiently. 
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Executive Summary 
Numerous reforms since the 1950s have attempted to improve the defense 
acquisition process, and almost all of these have included some form of resource 
management changes, large and small, intended to improve how the Department of 
Defenses (DOD) buys weapons, weapons platforms and equipment. Recent 
reforms—including more open competition, streamlined acquisition procedures, 
elimination of obsolete regulations and more effective program management—are 
some of the substantial changes made in DOD in the last fifteen years to improve 
acquisition management. The establishment of more open competition for DOD 
business is a significant part of recent acquisition transformation initiatives. Changes 
in acquisition information technology resulting from the passage of the Clinger-
Cohen Act and other legislation by Congress, the use of cost as an independent 
variable as a means of reducing acquisition costs, plus the push toward spiral 
acquisition are other changes that have been intended to yield positive results. 
Observing this trend, one understands that resource management and acquisition 
reform are constantly in progress in DOD. Also, the researchers understand that 
change sometimes is the result of internally driven management initiatives, while in 
other cases it results from action by Congress and in the Executive branch. 
This report serves three purposes. Our first purpose is to assess the future of 
PPBES and related budget reforms and to suggest that it may take more that a 
marginal adjustment to the current PPBES process to plan and budget most 
effectively for national defense and weapons acquisition. In this regard, we 
recommend that DOD, and the federal government as a whole, adopt a capital 
budgeting process. The second purpose is to review and assess previous 
acquisition reforms in DOD, many of which continue into the present. The third 
purpose is to assess modification of the current acquisition process to improve the 
business processes imbedded within this system, as well as to make the overall 
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Reform of PPBES and Defense Budgeting for 
Acquisition: Where to Next? 
PPBES changes have created a combined two-year program and budget-
review decision cycle (but not a biennial budget), with a complete review in year one, 
followed by limited incremental review in year two.  This change in cycle from a full-
program review and a full-budget review each year to a combined review with a 
comprehensive review happening every other year was meant to reduce the 
inefficiencies of unnecessary re-making of program decisions; the program should 
drive the budget rather than the opposite. With the programming and budgeting 
cycles operating contemporaneously, decisions should be made more effectively, 
whether they are made in the off- or on-year. Changes made in each off-year cycle 
are intended to come into effect more quickly by compressing the programming and 
budgeting cycles, while still preserving the decisions made in the on-year cycle 
through the off-year by limiting reconsideration of decisions to only the most 
necessary updates. In essence, decisions flow from the Quadrennial Defense 
Review and other studies; then, a structure is erected in the Strategic and Joint 
Planning Guidance that provides direction for the remaining years of a Presidential 
term.  
The processes summarized above will remain in place, in theory, to best 
assimilate and adapt DOD financial management and budgeting to dramatic 
changes in worldwide threat and, correspondingly, defense capability requirements. 
Year-to-year changes in the program structure and budget, then, are made only to 
adjust to incremental fact-of-life changes. Also, this new process will situate the 
Secretary of Defense in the decision environment at an earlier stage than in the old 
PPBS process; it put him “in the driver’s seat,” in the words of one DOD official. 
Decisions under the reformed PPBES are intended to reach the Secretary while 
options are still open, and while important and large-scale changes still can be 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 2 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
military department and service level. When the Defense Secretary’s input came at 
the end of the stream of decisions, some changes that could have been made were 
pre-empted because they would have caused too much “breakage” in other 
programs. This problem persists; and, as indicated in this report, this is only one of 
many business practice problems that need to be reassessed and changed to 
improve national defense resourcing. A goal of this report is to assess whether 
significant changes in DOD financial processes are warranted, and if so, what future 
change options should be considered. 
Up to this point in time, under former Secretary Rumsfeld and continuing 
under Defense Secretary Gates and his successors (presumably), a number of 
changes have been implemented to varying degrees. These changes were intended 
to improve the manner in which the PPBES serves as a decision system for DOD to 
better integrate financial decisions with acquisition decision-making.  The 
researchers conclude that this linkage has been strengthened somewhat, although 
not enough, through program review by the JCS (J8)—where all DOD acquisition 
programs now are reviewed for jointness, capability and feasibility.  
With respect to budget formulation (as opposed to execution), we might 
wonder what would happen to DOD resource decision-making if the POM were 
eliminated and replaced by a process of longer-term budgeting. In traditional 
budgeting, budget submitting offices (BSOs) have to answer several important 
questions as they ascertain what they need in the budget and as they justify their 
requests to funding sources. These questions include “what,” “why,” “when,” 
“where,” and “how.” The answer to ”how much” flows from the answers to the prior 
questions. All of these questions are important, but possibly the two most important 
questions in this set are the ”what” and ”why” questions. They set the stage for the 
fact-finding that causes answers to the “how,” “where,” and “when” questions to 
surface.  
For example, if there is no need for a ship or a tank, then there is no need to 
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configured or delivered. Budget decisions are based on this interrogative pattern. 
Much academic research has focused on the concept of incrementalism, i.e., that 
budgets change only by small amounts on the margin and not much as a percentage 
of the total from one year to the next. This is a tested analytic finding, but not one 
that is useful for the PPBES decision-makers because they do not build budgets by 
focusing on percent of change. Rather, they first determine what it is they need 
(capability and requirement). They do this by analyzing the world around them and 
its impact on the organization and its systems. They then establish what is needed 
to improve or operate more efficiently or effectively than in the previous planning 
period or fiscal year. Finally, they evaluate in detail what this will cost and what can 
be executed in the annual budget. 
With the implementation of the PPBS in 1964 under Robert McNamara, the 
defense budget system split the focus of these questions into three parts. The 
planning and programming functions (in which the SPG and POM are built) deal with 
the “what” and “why” questions, and to some extent “where” and “when.” Most of 
what is left for the budget process is the task of answering the question, “how much 
this year?” Still, budget formulators do have to present their fully justified budget to 
reviewers in the DOD, the OMB, and Congress. This means that they have to 
convey the part of the POM that answers the “how” and “what” questions, along with 
the request for “how much.” To do this, budget offices have to put back together the 
pieces of the program that are built in different places for different purposes by 
different sponsors. Asking what the best profile for the ingredients for an aircraft 
carrier battle group over the next ten years (a planning and programming question) 
is different from asking how much is needed to operate the battle group for the next 
year. However, in PPBES, to decide ”how much,” the budgeters have to know what 
the total program will look like in practice. 
As long as there is clear articulation and separation of these processes and 
one feeds carefully into the other, this system can work—as long as the POM feeds 
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happy to have many of the big resource questions decided for them, leaving them to 
focus on pricing-out next year’s needs. For their part, programmers have developed 
rules that allowed them to develop a good POM for each cycle. Usually, this means 
everyone gets something, but no one gets everything they want. 
With the passage of time, dysfunctions appeared in this scenario. First, the 
military departments created POMs that were more conducive to their needs than to 
joint warfighting needs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms (1986) were intended to 
rectify this situation. Then, with the drawdown after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
budget offices were placed in the awkward position of having to make decisions 
because the calendar said it was time to do so—even when the POM had not been 
completed—because those who built the POM could not decide which was the best 
way to downsize while maintaining the capacity to deter or fight future wars. Military 
department and DOD budget offices were, by and large, unhappy at having to make 
programmatic drawdown decisions in this situation. However, now in the past few 
years, the program decision-making process has not been completed in time to meet 
the needs of the budget part of the process.  
Most recently, this is allegedly due to the combined program- and budget-
review process under the PPBES. Also, various changes have been made to the 
processes of planning and programming for weapons acquisition, but none has been 
fully successful. Part of the problem is the overly complicated programming and 
budgeting process. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have 
characterized the PPBES process as too slow and too complicated. As part of his 
transformation effort, Rumsfeld and his DOD staff changed PPBES so that the 
programming and budgeting analysis and decision phases could be roughly 
concurrent. The POM process begins first, but both the budget and the POM 
process are supposed to end at the same time. In effect, the failure of the 
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In reality, the budget process can only reach the “how much” question by 
answering the ”what” and “why” questions. If the answers to these questions all 
appear at the same time, or are not answered at all, then the budget process has to, 
in effect, duplicate what is supposed to be done in the POM process to produce a 
budget on time. Indeed, under the new PPBES process, some parts of the budget 
process have had to operate as if there was no POM process. 
This leads to the question: is there a genuine need to prepare a POM, 
especially if budgeting is done on a longer-term basis of two to five years? Perhaps 
it would be useful to take the transformational PPBES reform one step further and 
discard the separate POM process by simply incorporating the POM questions and 
POM process outputs into the budget process? This may be a more sizeable task 
than it appears due to the existence of a bureaucracy which produces the POM. A 
first response is that participants in this bureaucracy might resist, fearing their loss of 
jobs. On the other hand, this is perhaps a less sizeable task than it seems because 
the military staff members involved in the POM process have other career lines and 
can perform functions as warfighters and/or players in the defense-acquisition 
process or the warfare-requirements-setting system. There would be some civilian 
positions, mainly those in the Pentagon, that would disappear in this new integrated 
POM/budget cycle—a cycle that could perhaps be called the planning, budgeting 
and execution system (PBES). Despite this problem, replacement of the entire 
PPBE system with longer-range budgeting is the option we prefer—primarily 
because it would restore an orderly and complete analytical process while 
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Related Budget Reforms 
While creating a two-phase planning and budgeting system of the type 
outlined above would rationalize the operation of PBE within the DOD, an additional 
useful step would be to create a longer-term appropriation period. DOD fiscal 
execution patterns are needlessly complicated by the rush to spend one-year 
appropriations before the close of the fiscal year. And the mixing of different 
appropriation periods for different appropriations needlessly complicates 
administration for those who execute budgets.  
Most of the DOD budget functions on a multi-year pattern—longer for military 
construction and procurement of long-lived assets such as ships and aircraft, and 
shorter for personnel and supporting expenses (O&M). However, even if personnel 
funding is legally an annual appropriation, in reality the force size and composition is 
relatively fixed and will remain so until some external crisis event forces review and 
change. Personnel could as well be a two, three, or even a five-year appropriation. 
We suggest that the DOD budget is, in effect, a multiple-year budget now. It would 
make sense to recognize it as such and to appropriate for multiple-year periods for 
all accounts, and to extend the obligation period for short-term accounts beyond one 
year at minimum.  
A two-year appropriation (or obligation period) for personnel and O&M 
accounts would be a useful starting point for Congress, as we have noted. Critics of 
such an approach often point to Congress’s need to exercise oversight through the 
budget. However, Congress can exercise whatever oversight it cares to in various 
ways—for example, by focusing on execution reviews in off-budget years in a two-
year cycle. A two-year budget also would reduce the opportunity for Congress and 
the President to insert what all recognize as “pork” into defense appropriations.  The 
suggestions we make here would reduce opportunities for pork. Yet, they would also 
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Pentagon bureaucracy, while releasing additional military officers from administrative 
jobs to return to duty in their warfare specialties.  
It must be noted that the task of defense resource planning and budgeting is 
part managerial and part political. Thus, from our perspective, no amount of budget 
process, PPBES or business process reform will reconcile the different value 
systems and funding priorities for national defense and security represented by 
opposing political parties, nor will it eliminate the budgetary influence of special-
interest politics. Value conflict was evident in the early 1980s when public support, 
combined with strong Presidential will and successful budget strategy, produced 
unprecedented peacetime growth in the defense budget—in particular, in the 
investment accounts. Constituent and special-interest pressures make it difficult for 
Congress and the DOD to realign the defense budget. While we applaud the spirit of 
many of the changes made in DOD during the period 2001-2005, reform of the 
defense budgeting process does not mean that producing a budget for national 
defense politically will be much easier in the future than it has been in the past. 
Threat perception, capabilities assessment and politics drive the defense budget, not 
the budgets process itself (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). Additionally, the size of the 
deficit and rate of increase in mandatory expenditures make top-line financial relief 
for the DOD unlikely. 
We also may observe that a sequence of annual budget increases for 
national defense in the early and mid-2000s have not brought relief to many 
accounts within the DOD budget. At the same time, requirements of fighting the War 
on Terror have intensified the use of DOD assets and the costs of military 
operations. Because the need for major asset renewal has been postponed for too 
long, new appropriations have gone and will go in the future largely to pay for new 
weapons system acquisition and for warfighting against terrorism. What this means 
is that accounts such as those for Operations and Maintenance for all branches of 
the armed services will continue to be under pressure and budget instability; 
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on DOD leadership, analysts and resource-process participants to achieve balance 
in all phases of defense budgeting and resource management.  
Ending what we know as programming and the POM would be a major 
change to PPBES. In our view, programming is only effective, if at all, at the end-
game anyway. Yet, preparing and processing the POM wastes huge amounts of 
valuable DOD staff time and energy that can be put to better use. Also, ideally, the 
period for obligation of all accounts in the new DOD budget process would stretch 
over a period of two or three years—including fast-spend accounts such as O&M, 
MILPERS, etc. The reason for multiple-year obligation for all accounts is to enable 
more effective budget execution and to end the highly wasteful and inefficient end-
of-year "spend it or lose it" incentive syndrome. (Some will argue that there would 
still be a rush to spend at the end of  whatever the appropriation period is; for 
starters, we will gladly accept a 50% improvement if it happens every two years 
rather than every year). This change would, of course, require the approval of 
Congress. However, the DOD could implement long-range budgeting (including 
capital budgeting) as a part of the overall reform—while Congress continues to 
operate on the annual budget cycle it prefers (for a number of reasons related to 
serving constituent and member interests). No change in the federal budget process 
can be made unless it permits Congress to continue to do its business according to 
the incentives faced by members. To think otherwise is naïve. Still, as noted above, 
the only part of the reform advocated here that would require explicit congressional 
action is the lengthened obligation period for all accounts to two or three years, as 
has been done internationally (in the UK, for example). Indeed, this increased 
obligation period occurred in the US in a small way in the early 1990s before the 
elimination of what was termed the "M" account due to illegal use of this account by 
the Air Force in financing the B-1 bomber and other programs. DOD had 
substantially greater flexibility in managing money for which the obligation period 
had expired. Under the M account process, expired funding was allowed to be 
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The change to extend the obligation period for one-year appropriations to two 
years would require Congress only to modify certain provisions of appropriation law. 
Otherwise, the DOD could implement a long-range accrual-based budgeting system 
on its own, subject to gaining approval of and support for it from Congress—but this 
would not require change in law. In essence, it is incumbent on the DOD to 
persuade Congress to support such change, and this will only occur if the DOD is 
able to show members how they, the DOD and the American taxpayer will be better 
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Reforms Leading to Capital Budgeting in DoD 
If budget reforms are going to be made, management reforms must be made 
simultaneously to ensure that change is properly implemented and all persons 
involved are aware of and are willing and able to make the appropriate 
organizational and process adjustments.  This is especially true if one of the reforms 
is decentralizing part of the decision-making process.  Decentralizing the decision-
making process should, in our view, involve the use of capital budgeting, in which 
additional authority for capital asset purchases could be further shifted down to 
program managers at the military department level. Even though former SECDEF 
Rumsfeld’s requests for “broadened discretionary powers” in the Defense 
Transformation Act (DTA) and in other appeals were generally denied by Congress, 
with the exception of giving DOD authority to develop a new personnel system, 
many of these ideas had considerable merit (McCaffery & Jones, 2004).  
Since federal agencies have much tighter constraints than businesses in the 
private sector, it is difficult to provide incentives for agencies to better manage their 
capital assets. However, Congress could adopt policies similar to those in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and allow departments and agencies, 
including DOD, to raise and keep revenues from selling or renting out existing assets 
(President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting, 1999).  Further, as suggested 
by the DAPA report (2006), Congress and DOD should establish a capital reserve 
account to improve financial stability for acquisition. If good capital budgeting 
processes were established in the budget process, and if agencies were allowed to 
keep revenues from the sale of assets, at least two incentives would exist for 
agencies to manage their assets well.  
If capital budgeting was implemented, the strategic plans of the departments 
could be more easily and efficiently integrated into both resource management and 
acquisition decision and execution processes within DOD.  Although the 
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year strategic plans, the plans are currently not used directly in considering 
appropriation requests for capital assets and spending.  Additionally, it would be 
useful for planning purposes if the strategic plans and budgets were tied to the 
lifecycles of the capital assets.  Although the Capital Programming Guide directs 
agencies to consider lifecycle costs and compare them to expected benefits, the 
lifecycle costs are not directly linked to the agency’s strategic plans.  If capital asset 
lifecycle costs were tied to strategic plans, funding for the maintenance and 
replacement of assets could be better anticipated.  In our opinion, capital budgeting 
should be done on an accrual basis so that program and budgetary plans would 
include all future outlays for capital asset acquisition, especially for new weapons 
systems.  If lifecycles are estimated for assets, then the department would commit 
more explicitly to replacement of obsolete equipment and systems (President’s 
Commission to Study Capital Budgeting, 1999). 
In an effort to assist agencies in making decisions on capital asset 
investments, the agencies should continue to prepare annual financial statements as 
required by the CFO Act.  It should be noted, however, that preparation of financial 
statements simply for CFO compliance should not be the goal.  The goal should be 
preparation of financial statements that are used to improve decision-making.  In 
addition, departments and agencies would prepare and use the detailed inventories 
of existing capital assets required by the CFO Act.  The information in these reports 
would be consolidated by DOD and used to guide DOD and the MILDEPS in 
preparing long-term capital plans, similar to and replacing the FYDP. This would 
assist Congress in reviewing and assessing these plans. 
Most states have separate capital budgets.  Analyses of case studies of state 
capital budgets add fuel to the debate over whether there should be a separate 
capital budget at the federal level.  While there are many critics of a separate capital 
budget at the federal level, proposals for instituting separate capital acquisition funds 
(CAF) at the agency level have been advanced and analyzed by the President’s 
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In implementation, the separation process would require all federal 
departments and agencies to prepare and submit to OMB (or in the case of DOD, to 
submit directly from OSD to Congress) a separate capital budget. Following this, 
once capital budgets were negotiated between agencies, analyzed and approved by 
Congress as part of the annual budget process, a segment of the department’s 
appropriations enacted by Congress would be placed in the department's capital 
acquisition fund and could only be used for acquiring long-lived capital assets.  This 
is the application of capital budgeting that would fit most comfortably into the existing 
federal budget process.  
A more comprehensive approach would be to establish a single capital 
acquisition fund for the entire federal government as a separate account entity. 
Under this approach (the agency-based option), a CAF would borrow from the 
Treasury to buy capital assets, and the Treasury would charge operating units a 
debt service amount based on an "equitable" rate of interest (e.g., at the federal 
prime rate, or possibly discounted for internal government borrowing).  Additionally, 
the CAF would inherit all of the agency’s existing capital assets in an effort to 
capture all agency costs of capital.   
The argument in support of the CAF approach is that a single fund or multiple 
separate funds for capital acquisition would help agencies better plan and budget for 
capital assets.  In addition, agencies would be better held accountable for planning 
and budgeting and, presumably, would be more likely to use their resources 
efficiently.  These funds would also smooth-out the budget authority required by 
agencies and would help to reduce potential spikes in the budget associated with 
full-funding requirements.  An important aspect of introducing separate capital 
acquisition funds, however, is the definition of capital assets.  OMB would have to 
issue guidance on what constitutes a capital asset to ensure implementation is 
consistent throughout the agencies (President’s Commission to Study Capital 
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While the Government Accountability Office (GAO) originally agreed with and 
supported the recommendation to implement capital acquisition funds, GAO then 
published a study concluding that the proposed benefits of CAFs could be achieved 
through simpler means (GAO, 2005).  GAO asserted that CAFs, as a financing 
mechanism for federal capital assets, would ultimately increase management and 
oversight responsibilities for the Treasury Department, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the departments 
and agencies that would utilize CAFs.   
While recognizing that CAFs might improve decision-making and remove 
many of the spikes and troughs in Budget Authority (BA) associated with large-dollar 
capital assets, GAO noted that some federal agencies now use different approaches 
to address capital investment planning and decision-making.  GAO research on 
capital-intensive federal agencies, coupled with interviews the agency conducted 
with officials from Congress, the Treasury, and OMB, led to its conclusion that CAFs, 
as proposed by the President’s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting, would be 
too complicated for implementation because of the additional budget complexities 
that they would create.  Interviews with executive and congressional officials led 
GAO to believe that a proposal to institute CAFs, even on a pilot basis, would have 
few, if any, proponents.  Because of these reasons, GAO recommended that the 
focus should be placed on improvement and widespread implementation of 
improved asset management and cost-accounting systems to address the problems 
for which CAFs were proposed as a solution (GAO, 2005).   
We regard the GAO criticism of the CAF as correct in that it would be a 
significant departure from how budgeting for long-lived assets is done presently in 
the federal government, and that it is not entirely compatible with the current 
congressional budget process. However, to reject this proposal for this reason is to 
miss the point about the need for and advantages of capital budgeting. Thus, we 
believe the GAO analysis, while accurate, misses the point. What we recommend for 
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Capital Budgeting on what is needed. We assert that the benefits of capital budgets 
include the following:  
 Improved assessment of the condition of existing capital assets,  
 Better estimates of the funding needed for maintaining assets,  
 More clearly and directly assigned priorities for capital asset 
investment in a separate capital budget (or budget component).   
 Application of better cost information from DOD accounting systems to 
assist budgeting decisions.   
 Investment of funds to achieve necessary improvements in basic DOD 
transactional and cost-accounting systems so they are capable of fully 
informing capital planning and budgeting decisions in real-time and in 
discounted present-value terms. 
Our recommendations represent a mix of the methods used by the private 
sector and are similar to approaches practiced by most US state governments.  
To conclude this section of the report, as we have explained, part of the basic 
business model for asset acquisition to be applied under a reengineered system is a 
private-sector-oriented capital budgeting process in which asset and financial 
resource planning are completely integrated into the budget and resource 
management processes rather than separated (as is the case with existing DOD 
acquisition and resource management systems) (i.e., PPBES). The new business 
model would employ a single, fully integrated ERP IT system and database rather 
the multiple systems and databases that characterize existing DOD systems.  
From a managerial perspective, leading the DOD capital budget process and 
redesigned acquisition process would still be the task of the USD AT&L and the 
small acquisition staffs of the MILDEPS; it would still require input from combatant 
commanders to determine the capabilities desired for the warfighting. Capital 
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Under DOD capital budgeting, a prioritized list of desired capabilities would be 
established under the sole authority delegated to the USD AT&L, under the advice of 
a small JCS staff, but without the JCIDS process—because, in our view, this 
process has only added unnecessary complexity to a review and analysis process 
that was already overcomplicated. We acknowledge that the JCS should perform 
analysis of interoperability, jointness of asset use, and system compatibility, but this 
should be done with much less procedural complexity than is present in the JCIDS 
process. We do not believe JCIDS represents a better way of doing business than 
the admittedly inefficient process it replaced—or more aptly put—only augmented.  
The Secretary of Defense, except symbolically, would not be a player in the 
reengineered capital budget process and system based on the fact that except in 
extraordinary instances, he is not a player in the system as it presently functions; 
according to modern business management theory and principles of delegation of 
authority and matching responsibility/accountability, the DoD should "let managers 
manage." Once the prioritized capabilities list was set, the estimated costs 
(assuming a high degree of uncertainty in many cases, e.g., RDT&E) of acquiring 
capabilities would be matched up with estimates of the availability of resources with 
data drawn from the single long-range budgeting system. And, as capital budgeting 
is performed in the private sector and in many US state governments, a line would 
be drawn, determined on affordability, at someplace on the list. All assets to be 
acquired that fell above the line would be contracted for development and RDT&E by 
the private sector. All assets that fell below the line of affordability would not be 
started. In terms of how the current acquisition milestone process is organized and 
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A Review of Process Changes in Weapons 
Acquisition and Resource Management 
Numerous reforms since the 1950s have attempted to improve the defense 
acquisition process, and almost all of these have included some form of resource-
management changes, large and small, intended to improve how DOD buys 
weapons, weapons platforms and equipment. Recent reforms—including more open 
competition, streamlined acquisition procedures, elimination of obsolete regulations 
and more effective program management—are some of the substantial changes 
made in DOD in the last fifteen years to improve acquisition budgeting and 
management. The establishment of open competition also is a significant part of 
recent acquisition transformation initiatives. Changes in acquisition information 
technology resulting from the passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other legislation 
by Congress, the use of cost as an independent variable as a means of reducing 
acquisition costs, plus the push toward spiral acquisition are other changes that 
have been intended to yield positive results.  
This report reviews a number of the more important procedural, regulatory, 
and legislative reforms to the defense acquisition process initiated and implemented 
over roughly the past 15 years. Some of the reforms noted are no longer in use, but 
have implications for current processes. Even though these changes are no longer 
under implementation, understanding their intent helps to paint a picture of how the 
system evolved to where it is today. For example, the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act (FARA) and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) have been 
incorporated into other DOD acquisition administrative law, referred to as 
instructions by number in DOD, e.g., DOD 5000.2R. In each example of reform, 
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Assessing Past and Continuing Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
Pervasive problems persist in the process for acquiring defense assets. 
These problems include affordability, cost control, keeping to schedules, and 
performance estimating errors. Estimates of weapon program affordability often are 
based on optimistic assumptions about the maturity and availability of enabling 
technologies (GAO, 1997). The use of outdated information systems makes the 
ability to accurately track and measure acquisition costs even more difficult. Thus, 
weapons acquisition reform is driven by myriad factors and is borne out of the desire 
to acquire the best weaponry at the least cost. Beyond technical issues, the politics 
of acquisition are complex and present additional challenges. In summary, continual 
tension persists between top-level policy and budget process players—including 
Congress, defense acquisition executives, and mid-level DOD officials (such as 
program managers and comptrollers)—confronted with limited resources and a 
complex set of constraints in the form of laws, rules, regulations and guidance.  
In assessing acquisition reforms past and present, we must emphasize that 
the DOD budget is reviewed and appropriated in competition with other priorities. In 
that respect, the world has changed significantly in the last two decades, as the 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report commissioned by 
Acting Secretary of Defense Gordon England in 2005 concluded: 
The fundamental nature of defense acquisition and the defense industry has 
changed substantially and irreversibly over the past twenty years […] In 1985, 
defense programs were conducted in a robust market environment where 
over 20 fully competent prime contractors competed for multiple new 
programs each year. The industrial base was supported by huge annual 
production runs of aircraft (585), combat vehicles (2,031), ships (24) and 
missiles (32,714). Most important, there were well-known, well-defined threats 
and stable strategic planning by the Department. Today, the Department 
relies on six prime contractors that compete for fewer and fewer programs 
each year. In 2005 reductions in plant capacity have failed to keep pace with 
reduction in demand for defense systems, (188 aircraft, 190 combat vehicles, 
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The Panel’s key findings (as summarized in the graphic below) focus on 
process stability, increased trust, decreased oversight and continued accountability. 
We offer this only to remind readers that this is a highly complex area in which 
problems are many and seemingly easy solutions are often ruled out by the 
necessity for checks and balances between branches of government, the continued 
need for oversight between government and the private sector, and continuing 
demands for vigilance in the use of public money. As a result, solutions sometimes 
are easy to prescribe, but hard to bring about.   
Figure 1. Major Findings on Acquisition Reform from the DAPA  














The Federal Acquisition Reform Act—The Clinger-Cohen Act 
DOD issued an update to its regulations governing the acquisition of major 
weapon systems on 13 October 1994. Among other things, the update incorporated 
new laws and policies (including the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act), 
separated mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices, and 
reduced the volume and complexity of the regulations. The Federal Acquisition 
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performance goals for all of the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and 
for each phase of their acquisition cycles. Highlights included streamlined proposal 
information or page count, shortened proposal submission time, reduced evaluation 
team size or evaluation time, and limited source-selection factors pertaining to cost, 
past experience, performance, or quality of content. The FASA called for full and 
open competition, to be obtained when, “all responsible sources are permitted to 
submit sealed bids for competitive proposals" (Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
2000). Full and open competition is achieved through open specifications (US Code 
253a (1) (A)). 
The FASA establishes a clear preference for acquisition of commercial items 
in the federal government. It requires agencies to reduce impediments to buying 
commercial products and to train appropriate personnel in the acquisition of such 
products. One such impediment is the use of design specifications, which restrict 
competition and make acquisition of commercial products difficult. Design 
specifications typically tell a vendor how a product is to be made or how a service is 
to be performed. A commercial vendor, whose product has been developed for 
public use, seldom conforms to government design specifications. The FASA 
instilled flexibility and timeliness into the acquisition process. 
The major pieces of legislation affecting acquisition and information 
technology were the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act. While originally passed as two separate 
initiatives, their impact on each other made it impossible to consider each 
separately. The two acts were later combined and renamed the Clinger-Cohen Act 
(1996). The major impact on information technology was the repeal of the Brooks 
Act and its associated restriction on acquisition of resources. The Clinger-Cohen Act 
encouraged the acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT products and 
allowed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to conduct pilot programs 
in federal agencies to test alternative approaches for acquisition of IT resources. The 
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of “interoperable increments” (Federal Register, 1996, p. 27). The Clinger-Cohen Act 
created the position of Chief Information Officer for the Department of Defense, and 
combined lifecycle approvals for weapon systems and information technology 
systems into a single instruction: the DOD 5000.1 series. 
FARA and FASA have been overtaken or superseded by other DOD reform 
initiatives applicable to MDAPs and weapons acquisition. Still, both FARA and FASA 
are valid and enforceable.  The FARA, among many other things, expanded the 
definition of “commercial items” to include those things not only sold to the general 
public, but also those offered to the general public. These initiatives were pushed by 
industry, primarily because under the two Acts, firms participating in government 
acquisitions with qualified “commercial” products are exempted from over 100 
statutory and regulatory requirements.  For example, firms may be exempted from 
the Truth in Negotiations Act that requires firms to certify cost and pricing data on 
negotiated actions greater than $550K (Yoder, 2003).    
Additional reforms have involved fostering the development of measurable 
cost, schedule, and performance goals as well as incentives for acquisition 
personnel to reach those goals. Among other things, program managers (as well as 
senior DOD and military department officials) now must establish cost, schedule, 
and performance goals for acquisition programs and annually report on their 
progress in meeting those goals. They must establish personnel performance 
incentives linked to the achievement of goals. Program Executive Offices also must 
submit recommendations for legislation to facilitate the management of acquisition 
programs and the acquisition workforce. 
In this respect, it should be noted that each service has an acquisition 
executive responsible for acquisition and contracting workforce education and 
training, among other things. For example, in the Navy, the Director of Acquisition 
Management (DACM) is responsible for all Navy acquisition career-management 
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 Promotion parity analysis  
 Reservist policies  
 Congressional and legislative education/training issues  
 Defense Acquisition University mandatory education and training  
 Acquisition Workforce Tuition Assistance   
 Business and Financial management  
Contracting out services has been a major initiative since 2000 under the 
guidance of the Office of Management and Budget. In 2000, federal agencies 
procured more than $235 billion in goods and services. Overall, contracting for 
goods and services accounted for about 24 percent of federal government FY 2001 
discretionary resources, and this percentage has remained relatively constant (OMB, 
2003; OMB, 2007). About 38 percent of acquisition personnel government-wide are 
either already eligible to retire or will be eligible by September 30, 2007 (OMB, 
2003a). At DOD and DOE—the two largest contracting agencies—39 percent of the 
acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire by fiscal year 2008 (GAO, 2003). What 
this means is that the human capital skill mix will change dramatically as retirements 
proceed and new personnel are hired. In the meantime, new requirements, tasks, 
and skills are demanded of both old and new acquisition managers as a result of 
federal and acquisition regulatory reform efforts. A review of some of these changes 
follows. 
Commercial Off-the-shelf Acquisition 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) applies to all contracting 
regulations. The pertinent part of the FAR with regard to commercial off-the-shelf 
reforms (COTS) is Part 12, which indicates (in essence) that federal government 
organizations should perform market research to maximize the use of commercial 
products. DOD enforcement of the FAR Part 12 over the past five years has caused 
weapon program managers to evaluate and, where appropriate, purchase 
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industry, if they meet the organization’s needs. Defense contractors are required to 
incorporate CNDI to the maximum extent possible. 
Initial feedback on the success of this initiative is highly positive. It appears 
that the change has permitted commercial firms to develop the kinds of new 
products that meet DOD needs. Specifically, firms that developed sophisticated 
products in significantly less time and at lower cost than their predecessors have 
been rewarded with contracts. However, to some extent, the quality and credibility of 
commercial firm cost information available to DOD acquisition decision-makers 
remains a problem. The long-term lifecycle support costs associated with utilizing 
potentially rapidly obsolete commercial items has yet to be fully documented (Yoder, 
2003). 
Cost as an Independent Variable  
DOD Directive 5000.1 directed a new development in cost analysis termed 
"Cost as An Independent Variable," or CAIV. System performance and target costs 
are to be analyzed on a cost-performance tradeoff basis. The CAIV process is 
intended to make cost a more significant constraint as a variable in analyses of the 
effectiveness and suitability of systems. CAIV is intended to reduce acquisition 
costs. After Desert Storm and before the War on Terror began on September 11, 
2001, threats were not increasing in perceived capability at as fast a rate. The DOD 
acquisition budget decreased accordingly. Under these circumstances, it was more 
appropriate to make cost a stronger driver in system design due to decreased 
budgets. Such an approach also was consistent with commercial practices in new 
system developments, in which market forces drive the price of new systems. 
CAIV helps the program manager recognize that the majority of costs are 
determined early in a program’s lifecycle. Consequently, the best time to reduce 
lifecycle costs is early in the acquisition process. Cost reductions are accomplished 
through cost and performance tradeoff analysis, which is conducted before an 
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industry to achieve the objectives of CAIV. Awards programs and “shared savings” 
programs are used creatively to encourage generation of cost-saving ideas for all 
phases of lifecycle costs. Incentive programs target individuals and government and 
industry teams. The program manager (PM) works closely with the user to achieve 
proper balance among cost, schedule, and performance while ensuring that systems 
are both affordable and cost-effective. The PM, together with the user, proposes 
cost objectives and thresholds for MDA approval, which will then be controlled 
through the APB process (Lifecycle Costs). The PM searches continually for 
innovative practices to reduce lifecycle environmental costs and liability. 
Research by Coopers and Lybrand identified over 120 regulatory and 
statutory "cost drivers" that, according to contractors surveyed, increased the price 
DOD pays for goods and services by 18 percent (Lorell & Graser, 1994). Some of 
the more egregious cost drivers included government-imposed accounting and 
reporting standards and systems such as Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and 
complex contract requirements and statements of work (SOW) (1994).  The basic 
goal of this study was to develop a more “commercial-type” defense acquisition 
process. This included reducing regulator burden; transferring more program cost, 
design and technology control authority and responsibility to the contractor; 
exploiting commercially developed parts, components, technologies and processes; 
and making cost/price a key requirement. This study was compatible with the goals 
of the Revolution in Business Affairs under the Clinton administration and 
Transformation of Business Affairs under the administration of President George W. 
Bush.  
The Single Process Initiative 
In 2002, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed DOD to 
change the management and manufacturing requirements of existing contracts to 
unify them within one facility, where appropriate (LeBrecht, 2002). This initiative is 
called the block change or single process initiative (SPI). Program managers are 
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contractors to use a single process in their facilities is a natural progression from the 
contract-by-contract process of removing military-unique specifications and 
standards initiated in the FASA. Contractors will incur transition costs that equal or 
exceed savings in the near term. The move to common, facility-wide requirements is 
intended to reduce government and contractor costs in the long term.  
DOD 5000.2R Transformation from Regulatory to Policy Guidance 
In 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed that DOD 5000.2R be converted from a 
regulatory tool to a more functional and flexible policy guidance document. The 5000 
Series has, in the past, been regarded as administrative law. It demanded user 
requirements—including the preparation of operational requirements documents 
(ORD) and estimation of initial operational capability. The 5000.2R acquisition 
requirements had been firm and not subject to modification without specific waivers 
(Rieg, 2000). However, the SECDEF, the services, and program managers 
recognized the need for greater flexibility to manage acquisition.  
The revised DOD 5000.2-R document promised to piggy-back on other 
acquisition reforms, allowing greater flexibility and control for acquisition leadership. 
It was revised to recommend that integrated process teams (IPT) be used during 
program definition to aid the definition of requirements and system supportability. In 
addition, program structure changes are directed to include an acquisition strategy of 
open systems. To maximize program effectiveness, the program manager is 
directed to use commercial sources, risk management, and CAIV. The PM should 
use program design incorporating integrated product and process development 
(IPPD) and should place system engineering emphasis on production capability, 
quality, acquisition logistics, and open system design (Oberndorf & Carney, 1998). 
Director of Acquisition Program Initiative 
In past practice, annually the Director of Acquisition Program Integration 
determined if each MDAP had reached 90 percent or more of cost, schedule, and 
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thresholds. The appropriate decision authority must make a similar determination for 
non-major acquisition programs. If 10 percent or more of program parameters are 
missed, a timely review is required. The review addresses any breaches in cost, 
schedule, and performance and recommends suitable action, including termination.  
Major acquisition defense program baselines must be coordinated with the 
DOD Comptroller before approval. Cost parameters are limited to RDT&E, 
acquisition, acquisition of items procured with operations and maintenance funds, 
total quantity, and average-unit acquisition cost. As the program progresses through 
later acquisition phases, acquisition costs are refined based on contractor actual 
costs from program definition and risk reduction (PDRR), engineering, 
manufacturing and development, or from initial production lots. Cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives are used as described above in the cost as an independent 
variable (CAIV) process to set the Acquisition Program Baselines. Cost, schedule, 
and performance may be traded-off by the PM within the range between the 
objective and the threshold without obtaining MDA approval. This initiative intends to 
improve executive-level oversight and program-management reporting. In addition, it 
may enhance executive and PM flexibility in the best use of available funding. 
A Revised Capital Account Process: Further Support for Capital 
Budgeting 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended that DOD establish a 
capital account for major acquisition programs. This would be a major change for the 
acquisition process. The recommendation mirrors the outcome of the Defense 
Acquisition Performance Assessment study directed by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Gordon England. In its findings in December, 2005, this study 
recommended: 
The Secretary of Defense should establish a separate Acquisition 
Stabilization account to mitigate the tendency to stretch programs due to 
shortfalls in the Department of Defense non-acquisition accounts that 
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the incidence of “breaking” programs to solve budget year shortfalls and 
significantly enhance program funding stability. (DAPA Panel, 2005, p. 10) 
In effect, the panel recognized that acquisition account leaders could not 
protect the acquisition accounts from acting as a bank for the operating accounts 
during budget execution—thus the recommendation that DOD procurement, 
research and development budget be separated from the overall defense budget. 
This separation would help prevent the kind of financial whiplash that causes cost 
overruns, according to retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, panel director and a 
vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton, a prominent defense consulting firm. The 
panel found that every $1 taken from a program induces $4 of cost increases in later 
years. “Though many in Washington blame the uncertainty of the annual budget 
approval process on Congress, most of the damage was self-inflicted by the 
Pentagon. It is largely a ‘government-induced' instability" (as cited in Ratnam, 2005). 
In Secretary England’s confirmation hearings, both the Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees expressed an interest in improving acquisition 
practices, an interest that was specified in the conference report on the DOD 
authorization bill. For example, the Senate report accompanying S1042, the Senate 
version of the Defense Authorization bill, noted that after nearly twenty years of 
reform since the Packard Commission Report and Goldwater-Nichols, “major 
weapons systems still cost too much and take too long to field.” The committee 
added, “Funding and requirements instability continue to drive up costs and delay 
the eventual fielding of new systems. Constant changes in funding and requirements 
lead to continuous changes in acquisition approaches” (US Senate, 2005, p. 345). 
This culminated in the recommendations and findings made in the QDR in language 
that went beyond the establishment of a capital account, to include a capital 
budgeting process: 
To manage the budget allocation process with accountability, an acquisition 
reform study initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended the 
Department work with the Congress to establish “Capital Accounts” for Major 
Acquisition Programs. The purpose of capital budgeting is to provide stability 
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programs throughout the hierarchy of program responsibility from the program 
manager, through the Service Acquisition Executive, the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Together, 
these improvements should enable senior leaders to implement a risk-
informed investment strategy reflecting joint warfighting priorities. (DoD, 2006, 
February, pp. 67-68) 
This process would be supported by joint collaboration among the warfighter, 
acquisition and resource communities, with the warfighters assessing needs and 
time-frame and the acquisition community contributing technological judgments on 
technological feasibility and “cost-per-increment” of capability improvement. The 
budget community’s contribution would be an assessment of affordability. These 
inputs would be provided early in the process, before significant amounts of 
resources are committed. The QDR also recommended that the DOD, “begin to 
break out its budget according to joint capability areas. Using such a joint capability 
view—in place of a Military Department or traditional budget category display—
should improve the Department’s understanding of the balancing of strategic risks 
and required capability trade-offs associated with particular decisions” (DoD, 2006, 
February, pp. 67-68). The DOD promised to explore this approach further with 
Congress. History indicates that Congress clings tenaciously to the appropriation 
structure currently in place because it serves Congress’s purposes, but it is good to 
remember that all that is now familiar was once new.  
It is clear that the defense acquisition process has long been beset by 
problems related to both politics and efficiency. As stated previously, numerous 
reforms since the 1950s have attempted to improve the acquisition process. Recent 
reforms—including more open competition, streamlined acquisition procedures, 
elimination of obsolete regulations and more effective program management—are 
some of the substantial changes made in DOD in the last ten years to improve 
acquisition budgeting and management. The establishment of open competition also 
is a significant part of recent acquisition transformation initiatives. Changes in 
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Act and using cost as an independent variable as a means of reducing acquisition 
costs are other changes expected to yield positive results. 
Congressional and DOD reform initiatives have focused on greater reliance 
on commercial products  and processes and more timely infusion of new technology 
into new or existing systems. Program managers utilize commercial products with an 
understanding of the complex set of consequences that stem from such use 
(Oberndorf & Carney, 1998). Solicitation requirements are written to include 
performance measures. If military specifications are necessary, waivers must first be 
obtained. Solicitations for new acquisitions that cite military specifications typically 
encourage bidders to propose alternatives (Secretary of Defense, 2002a). DOD has 
made significant progress in disposing of the huge inventory of military specifications 
and standards through cancellation, consolidation, conversion to a guidance 
handbook, or replacement with a performance specification or non-government 
standard.  
Some reforms already have had unanticipated consequences. For example, 
the FARA and FASA eliminate, with minor exceptions, the requirement for "certified 
cost and pricing data" under the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA). This has been 
heralded as a blessing for industry, but has caused problems for contracting officers 
who are mandated to determine "fair and reasonable" cost and price prior to award 
of contract. Specifically, there are instances in which firms have claimed 
"commercial item exemptions" from TINA, when not one single item has ever been 
sold to the general public; hence, there is little or no standard for determining the 
reasonableness of the price. Without TINA and cost analysis, the contracting officer 
may be awarding without solid factual benchmarks, standards, or measures of what 
is "fair and reasonable" (Yoder, 2003). 
The Defense Acquisition Corps has increased education and training 
requirements for key positions such as for the Critical Acquisition Position (CAP). 
CAPs are the most senior positions in the defense acquisition workforce, including 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 30 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
ACAT I defense acquisition programs and the program managers of significant non-
MDAP ACAT programs. Maximizing program manager and contractor flexibility to 
make cost/performance tradeoffs without (unnecessary) higher-level permission is 
essential to achieving cost objectives. Therefore, the number of threshold items in 
program requirements documents and acquisition program baselines has been 
reduced. All of these changes add up to significant, albeit incremental, 
transformation of the DOD acquisition system. 
The primary criticism of the acquisition process is that it is too complex, too 
slow, and too costly. It may also produce weapons that are irrelevant or “over-
qualified” for the task at hand if the threat has changed by the time they are finally 
put in the field. Annual budget-cycle politics add to this mix; the continual purchase 
of weapons because they are good for congressional electoral districts irrespective 
of defense needs is wasteful. In addition, there is the fact-of-life adjustment of the 
1990s; there was a procurement holiday which has resulted in increased 
maintenance costs for older weapons systems. The outcome is increased O&M 
budgets and a gap in the procurement budget that reaches into the tens of billions of 
dollars—a gap that will not be closed in the near future. Add to this mix the fact that 
almost 40% of the federal and defense acquisition community will be eligible to retire 
in 2008. This would seem to leave a problem of immense magnitude. However, as 
we have documented above, these are not new problems.  
The defense acquisition process has almost always appeared to be broken, 
but the irony of this is that the products it produces are among the best in the world. 
That is why Marines went into battle in their fathers’ helicopters and some pilots flew 
their grandfathers’ bombers over Iraq, why the main US battle tank has been 
superior to anything on the field for over a decade. Moreover, this broken process 
engineered and deployed missile-firing drone aircraft while the war in Afghanistan 
was in progress. The system can and has reacted quickly. America, the society of 
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excellent and durable. The process is cumbersome, overly expensive, complicated 
and highly political, but it does work.  
In the best of worlds, DOD would acquire weapons assets in an environment 
of stable funding and management. Acquisition process reform over the past ten 
years has sought to provide a more stable environment in which to acquire better, 
more efficient weapons. However, the era following the end of the Cold War and the 
advent of the War on Terror has made acquisition more difficult. Further, reforms of 
acquisition and PPBES processes have created their own turbulence as change has 
been continuous. At times, it is difficult for program managers and others involved in 
the DOD acquisition process to stay up-to-date on the status of change because one 
wave of reform spills over into the next.  Continuous improvement of weapons 
acquisition budget estimation, execution and management has and will continue to 
present a challenge to all participants in the process. The pattern of continuous 
reform of acquisition and budgeting for weapons systems over the past several 
decades is a fact of life. Why should anyone expect the future to be different? We 
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Acquisition Process and Resource Management 
Reform 
Reform of the entirety of DOD budget, financial management, and acquisition 
decision-making systems and business processes is a huge and ambitious topic to 
analyze, much less to accomplish. Our intent here is to advance our views on the 
practical underpinning for reform of defense resource, acquisition and business-
process management. We argue the necessity for relying on capital and longer-term 
budgeting and resource-management methods, more stringent application of 
business-process reengineering, and increased use of markets and the private 
sector in moving from bureaucratic approaches toward a smarter system of 
organization and operation.  
In any dialogue on the topic, we acknowledge that reform of DOD acquisition 
is not an easy task. Part of the problem is that so much reform has been attempted 
since the 1980s and that the results of these efforts have been mixed. To some 
extent, the dynamics of constant reform are part of the problem, and many recent 
changes have not been as successful as anticipated. As Dillard concluded: 
In the last three years, there has been a great deal of turbulence in U.S. 
defense acquisition policy. This has contributed to confusion within the 
acquisition workforce in terminology, major policy thrusts, and unclear 
implications of the changes. The new acquisition framework has added 
complexity, with more phases and delineations of activity, and both the 
number and level of decision reviews have been increased. Decision reviews 
are used as top management level project control gates, and are also a 
feature of centralized control within a bureaucracy. Although the current 
stated policy is to foster an environment supporting flexibility and innovation, 
the result is a continuous cycle of decision reviews. Program Managers may 
now have fewer resources to manage their programs as they spend much of 
their time, and budgets, managing the bureaucracy. Moreover, the implicit 
aspects of the still new model have not been fully realized, and may result in 
policy that actually lengthens programs—counter to goals of rapid 
transformation. The framework, and its associated requirements for senior 
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are counter to appropriate management strategies for a transformational era. 
(Dillard, 2005, p. 72; see also Dillard, 2004) 
Other prominent acquisition policy experts summarized the challenge of 
reform as follows:  
The Department of Defense (DOD) [is in] a transformative period—leveraging 
emerging technologies to develop a net-centric warfare capability—while 
actively conducting military operations, throughout the spectrum of conflict, in 
support of the global war on terror. As a result, DOD is struggling to meet 
these competing requirements and reconcile [...] spending between traditional 
and new programs. Therefore, creating a more efficient acquisition system is 
a top priority. High-quality research in the area of acquisitions is necessary to 
[...] improve performance, reduce acquisition cycle times, and reduce the 
costs of DoD acquisitions, even as the Department confronts rapidly changing 
external and internal environments. (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2005, p. 1) 
In this section of the report, we outline and articulate our proposals for 
fundamental reform of defense budgeting, resource and acquisition management 
systems and decision processes—based on and integrated with many of the 
principles of enterprise organization and management developed largely in the 
private sector, along with capabilities-based analysis, decision-making and 
implementation. First, however, let us summarize why we and many others believe 
significant acquisition business process reform should be undertaken in DOD. 
In our view, there is much that is wrong with DOD resource-decision 
processes and their relationship to the defense acquisition system. Too often 
PPBES and budgeting get in the way of efficient acquisition management. On its 
own, we believe that DOD resource management and acquisition decision 
processes are flawed to the extent that that they continuously propagate analytical 
and decision errors. They are excessively bureaucratic to the extent that they should 
be significantly redesigned, reengineered and de-bureaucratized. Many existing 
work processes should be replaced completely by new processes to enable 
improved capital asset investment analysis of alternatives, decision-making and 
execution in a much shorter period of time, involving far fewer participants, and in 
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emphasis on measurement of performance and results rather than input and 
process variables. These two systems (PPBES and the DAS), as they operate 
presently, are an incredible and wasteful triumph of process over substance. In 
short, we believe that if we really want to run DOD like a business (i.e., using smart 
business practices), the best way to accomplish this goal is to adapt smart systems 
into DOD and federal government organizations, with careful attention to the 
differences in purpose between government and the private sector, and in part to 
further move much of what is in our view non-governmental work to private 
business—through increased devolution and redirection of essentially non-
governmental functions into the private sector.  
With respect to the need for reform of DOD acquisition, budgeting and related 
processes, we are not alone in rendering the conclusion that such action is needed. 
Then Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England explained to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, (2005), “the entire acquisition structure within the 
Department of Defense needs to be reexamined and in great detail […] there is 
growing and deep concern about the acquisition process within the Department of 
Defense and in the Committee” (DAPA Panel, 2006, p. 3). In addition, the Senate 
committee reported:  
The committee is concerned that the current Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework is not appropriately developing realistic and 
achievable requirements within integrated architectures for major weapons 
systems based on current technology, forecasted schedules and available 
funding [...] The committee is […] concerned that problems with organization 
structure, shortfalls in acquisition workforce capabilities, and personnel 
instability continue to undermine the performance of major weapons systems 
programs […] Problems occur because Department of Defense’s weapon 
programs do not capture early on the requisite knowledge that is needed to 
efficiently and effectively manage program risks […] The committee believes 
that one answer can be found in the inability of the Department to address the 
budget and program stability issues. […] Funding and requirements instability 
continue to drive up costs and delays the eventual fielding of new systems. 
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A detailed study of the DAS by a select panel of experts (DAPA Panel, 2006) 
tasked by Deputy Defense Secretary England in June 2005 came up with similar 
conclusions. In his tasking letter England wrote, “Simplicity is desirable […] 
Restructuring acquisition is critical and essential” (England, 2005). The DAPA Panel 
reviewed over 1,500 documents to establish a baseline of previous 
recommendations, held open meetings and maintained a public web site to obtain 
public input, heard from 107 experts, received over 170 hours of briefings, and 
surveyed over 130 government and industry acquisition professionals (DAPA Panel, 
2006, p. 7). In December 2006, the DAPA Panel reported that the primary problem 
faced by acquisition executives and managers was program and funding instability, 
which is caused by the forces we have identified in this text. The Panel reached the 
following conclusions: 
 The acquisition system must deal with external instability, a changing 
security environment and challenging national issues. 
 The DoD management model is based on lack of trust—oversight is 
preferred to accountability. 
 Oversight is complex; it is program-focused—not process-focused. 
 Complex acquisition processes do not promote success—they 
increase cost and schedule. 
 DoD elects short-term savings and flexibility at the expense of long-
term cost increases.  
 Because [...] major processes are not well integrated: 
o We have an unrecognized, government-induced and long-
standing cycle of instability 
o which causes unpredictability in costs, schedule, and 
performance 
o that ultimately results in development programs that span 15-20 
years with substantial unit cost increases 
o leading to loss of confidence in DoD acquisition systems. 
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With respect to improving the performance of the system, the DAPA Panel 
recommended the following and organized its recommendations into the seven 
categories listed below: 
Organization 
 Realign authority, accountability and responsibility at the 
appropriate level and streamline the acquisition oversight 
process. 
Workforce 
 Rebuild and value the acquisition workforce and incentivize 
leadership. 
Budget  
 Transform the budgeting process and establish a distinct 
Acquisition Stabilization Account to add oversight throughout 
the process. 
Requirements—Process 
 Replace JCIDS with COCOM-led requirements procedures in 
Services, and DOD agencies must compete to provide 
solutions. 
Requirements—Management and Operational Test 
 Add an “operationally acceptable” test evaluation category. Give 
program managers explicit authority to defer requirements 
Acquisition—Strategy 
 Shift to time-certain development procedures  
 Adopt a risk-based source selection process 
Industry 
 Overcome the consequences of reduced demand by sharing 
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programs with the goal of motivating industry investments in 
future technology and performance on current programs. (DAPA 
Panel, 2006, p. 14) 
Specifically, related to budgeting for acquisition the Panel recommended the 
following: 
 Enhance the budget process by establishing a distinct Acquisition 
Stabilization Account for all post Milestone B programs. Add practical 
Management Reserve at the Service level. 
 Establish a separate Acquisition Stabilization account to mitigate the 
tendency to stretch programs due to shortfalls in DoD accounts that 
ultimately increase the total cost of programs. 
 Create a Management Reserve in this account by holding termination 
liability at the Service level. 
 Adjust program estimates to high confidence when programs are base-
lined in this account. (DAPA Panel, 2006, p. 17) 
The distinct Acquisition Stabilization Account and Management Reserve 
recommended by the DAPA Panel constitutes, in our view, a step towards 
establishing both a capital budget and a capital reserve account within the CAF for 
DOD, as we recommend. It is important to recognize that while R&D, design and 
prototyping, production and other contracted work would be paid for from the CAF 
under our proposed reform, the CAF would provide such funding from separate 
internal accounts based upon the legal requirements imbedded in statutory law for 
separation of appropriations by type. However, we would suggest that DOD make 
the case to Congress to fund a capital reserve account within the CAF to 
accommodate change more quickly than does the annual budget process and to 
provide additional stability to DOD acquisition and contractor defense firms.  
The conclusions developed by the DAPA Panel as rendered in its December 
7, 2006, report were carried forward subsequently in July 2007, when (in response 
to a reporting requirement from the 2007 Defense Authorization Act sponsored by 
Senator John Warner (R -VA)) Kenneth Krieg, USD AT&L at the time, submitted the 
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This report formally asked Congress to enact a number of the recommendations 
indicated above from the 2006 DAPA Panel report into law as part of the FY 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act (Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to 
Congress, 2007). 
Beyond capital budgeting, as is clear from the conclusion reached by the 
DAPA Panel and recommendations to Congress made by the USD AT&L, business 
process redesign and reengineering are key to successful acquisition process and 
related resource management reform. 
Business Process Reengineering: The Basics 
A major component of any DOD acquisition reform strategy will require very 
stringent application of business process reengineering; this will result in the 
implementation of new and more efficient organizational processes based on 
organizational redesign of roles and responsibilities and how work is performed. 
However, before we indicate specifically how business redesign and process 
reengineering would be applied in DOD, let us briefly review what this technique 
entails and how it is applied. 
Business process reengineering is an attractive initiative to public 
management reformers because reducing costs, cutting service production cycle-
time and improving quality and productivity so often depend on moving beyond the 
constraints imposed by traditional, highly bureaucratic ways of performing work. 
Business process redesign and reengineering endeavor to establish efficient work 
processes. At the most fundamental level, reengineering concentrates on “starting 
over” rather than on trying to “fix” existing process problems with marginal or 
incremental “band-aid” solutions. Barzelay has characterized traditional types of 
marginal organizational reform as "paving the cow paths" (1992).  In contrast, 
business process reengineering requires decision-makers concentrate on processes 
and not functions and positions in organizational hierarchies. The goals of 
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quality, combined with greater efficiency as measured primarily by reduced cycle-
time and cost. Reengineering takes advantage to the greatest extent of computer 
and other information technologies.  It requires repeated pilot testing of alternatives 
proposed to replace existing work processes prior to implementation of new systems 
and processes. 
Only a brief attempt is made here to define reengineering as much has been 
written about it, most notably by Hammer and Champy (Hammer & Champy, 1993; 
Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Hammer, 1996). Reengineering is a top-down process 
wherein the organization, typically driven by resource constraints and competitive 
market pressures, attempts to serve its customers better by reducing work process 
cycle-time which, in turn, can reduce costs either in the short- or long-term.  
Reengineering does not attempt to modify existing processes. Rather, it 
replaces existing processes with more efficient ways of doing business. Critical to 
accomplishing the goals of reengineering is increased use of computer and other 
information technologies to allow fewer employees to do the work formerly 
performed by more people. Reengineering alters work flow and sequential or 
reciprocal task-dependent relationships, short-cutting older processes—in part, 
through substituting computer-assisted data gathering, analysis, decision and 
management for manual human labor. However, the key is not so much replacing 
people with technology as much as it is working smarter, eliminating unnecessary, 
duplicative, paper-heavy work methods.  
Not surprisingly, reengineering can result in organizational redesign, e.g., 
flattening or “delayering” as fewer lower and mid-management employees are 
needed to do the same or better work after processes have been reengineered. This 
enables redeployment of some personnel to direct customer service, depending on 
demand, ability, aptitude and training. Essential to reengineering is investment in 
education and training of staff to operate new processes effectively. Reengineering 
success examples are numerous (Hammer & Champy, 1993, pp. 150-199; Hammer 
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show reduction of work process steps of 70 to 90 percent, cuts in cycle-time of 60 to 
80 percent and reduction of costs from 20 to 80 percent. In other words, 
reengineering is intended to make quantum rather than marginal performance 
improvements. 
The process of reengineering involves a commitment by executives to fully 
support the initiative, the selection and prioritization of processes to be 
reengineered, assignment of project responsibility to work teams, selection of work 
team members representing older processes and many or all of the stakeholders in 
the process outcomes, assignment of team leadership and reporting/liaison 
responsibilities, analysis of existing processes, development of alternatives to the 
status quo, pilot testing and evaluation of alternatives tested, integration of trial-and-
error lessons in redevelopment of alternatives, refinement of the best alternative 
and, finally, implementation of the new process and discontinuance of that which it 
replaces.  
Some simultaneous operation of old and new processes may be necessary 
temporarily. Selection and tasking of work teams is critical to achieving desired 
results. Continuity of executive support for testing and insulation for failure is 
essential. Some or many errors should be expected in attempting to define new 
processes. Full commitment of resources to see the reengineering initiative through 
also is critical. Staff time, technological support and funding must be provided as 
needed by process action teams. Furthermore, support for the effort must be 
virtually open-ended in terms of time schedule—i.e., teams must be free to work on 
alternatives until they have succeeded. Setting artificial end-dates by which process 
must be reengineered is not productive. Instead, teams should be asked to work 
until they “get it right.”  
The bottom line for evaluating the success of reengineering is improved 
customer satisfaction (i.e., results). Cycle-time and cost reduction are not ends in 
themselves. Rather, they are the results of better work processes. Metrics are critical 
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evaluating results and comparing them to those achieved under previously used 
processes have to be built into the reengineering effort. Without a means for 
measuring quantitatively and qualitatively the improvement in service, reengineering 
is virtually pointless. There are simpler ways to cut costs if this is the only objective. 
This means that results indices must be identified, databases and collection 
procedures designed and constructed; data must be gathered, analyzed and 
compared. Accounting data must be related to results measures to permit cost 
analysis as well as consumer response to process alternatives whose costs differ. 
Typically, different parts of the customer base will prefer different mixes of service 
quality and cost. Reengineering must attempt to accommodate such preferences, as 
this is the objective of change.  
Proponents of reengineering recognize that many organizational work flows, 
job designs, control mechanisms, and structures are either superfluous or obsolete.  
Reengineering processes, accompanied by restructuring and downsizing, intend to 
improve administrative performance and, by slimming the organizational 
bureaucracy, save money.  As Hammer explains:  
It is time to stop paving the cow paths.  Instead of embedding outdated 
processes in silicon and software, we should obliterate them and start over.  
We should reengineer our [organizations]; use the power of modern 
information processing technology to radically redesign our [...] processes in 
order achieve dramatic improvements in their performance [...]  We cannot 
achieve breakthroughs in performance merely by cutting fat or automating 
existing processes.  Rather we must challenge the old assumptions and shed 
old rules. (Hammer, 1990, pp. 104, 107)  
Application of System Redesign and Business Process 
Reengineering to DoD Acquisition 
Rigorous business process reengineering could be applied in DOD to the 
extent that much of the work and many of the steps in the current acquisition 
decision process would be eliminated, along with the need for the staffs, both civilian 
and military, that perform this work. This approach assumes than much of the work 
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or can be eliminated because this work adds no value relative to planning, decision-
making or program execution (Jones & Thompson, 2007).  
This is a somewhat harsh indictment of the current process; however, we 
believe our assumption about the need to eliminate many of work steps can and 
should be accomplished. Further, we assert that as a result of installation of smart IT 
systems and elimination of duplicative and unnecessary work, the reduction of cycle-
time for decision-making and execution will result in substantial increases in 
productivity and output and reduction of cycle-time—from the request for proposal to 
the fielding of the system; at the same time, such reduction will increase the quality 
of decisions and products and, as a result, reduce acquisition costs dramatically.  
Such an outcome is easy to prescribe but not so easy to implement. It is 
easier to define in general terms what work should remain and what a redesigned 
and reengineered process would look like than it is to list what would disappear as a 
result of radical process reengineering. Essentially, what should remain is the role of 
the central decision-makers with whom the responsibility for acquisition capabilities 
and requirements determination, analysis and decision-making rests, e.g., the USD 
AT&L, the acquisition chiefs in each of the MILDEPS, the MILDEPS combatant 
commanders, and the JCS. Most importantly, the responsibility to manage programs 
assigned to program managers should be matched by authority, with fewer 
accountability reviews and less oversight, to manage the programs for which they 
are responsible from a total systems approach—including full integration of lifecycle 
analytical methods.  
The challenge to the overall DAS is that the short-term needs of the 
warfighter commanders have to be balanced against the medium and longer-term 
demands of military departments and services for recapitalization. To accomplish 
this, warfighter requirements for capability have to be articulated by the combatant 
commanders (COCOMs) and integrated quickly into programs and budgets. In doing 
so, the COCOMs must address the issue of interoperability, whether it is required or 
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both for satisfactory joint warfighting operations and for staying within budget 
constraints. Thus, the DAS has to allow multiple lines of acquisition and procurement 
to operate simultaneously to meet short-, medium- and longer-term needs (Dillard, 
2007).  For example, as Humvee vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
"armored up" for the Army, Marines, Special Forces and other users, the Army 
simultaneously initiated buying a new and better armored vehicle (the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle or MRAP), and is in the process of designing 
and buying a new light armored vehicle from Textron corporation (the Peacekeeper 
II) to deploy in the battlefield of the future. 
While it is axiomatic to say that the warfighters' short-term needs must be met 
and, therefore, the combatant commanders have to play a potent role in the 
capabilities/requirements proposal process, longer-term recapitalizations cannot 
ever be ignored. Thus, in setting requirements and responding to contingencies as 
they emerge, both shorter- and longer-term capabilities have to be balanced against 
each other. The input from the COCOMs has to come up from the military 
departments and services, as do all proposals for new acquisition programs. On the 
other hand, the role of the MILDEP acquisition executives and, ultimately, the USD 
AT&L is to assess whether longer-range needs are balanced with what the 
COCOMs want. And the role of JCS is to insure interoperability to the extent 
possible.  
This is essentially how the DOD acquisition system works presently, and the 
reform we suggest would not alter the basic structure of this overall program-
proposal and decision-making process. However, we believe strongly that the overall 
process can and should be simplified and streamlined significantly. In a redesigned 
acquisition process, decision-makers would be assisted by smaller staffs to perform 
analysis. When we say smaller, we mean on the order of perhaps a dozen to twenty 
total staff persons in each office. Using the best and brightest minds, and IT and 
other tools of modern technology, these staffs would perform virtually all of the 
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of options to decision-makers and the other tasks leading to the actual contracting 
for RDT&E and acquisition. Gone would be the many offices and staffs that now 
perform such analysis, e.g., for preparation of the POM.  
In the Navy, this would result in the complete elimination of N81, for example. 
Staffs that presently perform program and project planning in and around the 
Pentagon and in Navy systems commands that are not involved in program 
execution would be reduced. The only duplication of effort in analysis of capability 
requirements would be between the small staffs of the USD AT&L and each of the 
staffs of the individual Secretariats and of the MILDEPS. In turn, as is the case 
presently, the MILDEPS would be responsible for input from the warfighting 
commands, although such input also would continue to flow to the Joint staff. In this 
regard, the JCIDS process, as it operates presently (or is supposed to operate) 
would be eliminated. This, however, would not relieve the JCS staff from conducting 
interoperability and jointness review for ACAT I programs. This function should 
remain a responsibility of the Joint staff. 
Under such reform, what would happen to the requirements to build the FYDP 
and the POM? Under this reform approach, there would be no FYDP because it is 
unneeded, always out of date and virtually useless for the purposes it was designed 
to meet in the 1960s under SECDEF Robert McNamara. However, as we indicate in 
this report, there would be a capital budget schedule to structure capital asset 
planning. Additionally, the POM drill that repeatedly rebuilds the defense program 
assets would disappear as unnecessary—because it is unnecessary to constantly 
rebuild a known base of assets to be acquired. As with zero-base budgeting, the 
POM "build it from the bottom all the way to the top" exercise is a complete waste of 
time and effort. All that really matters in the POM build are the decisions about new 
starts. The base will take care of itself on auto-pilot at the insistence of the 
MILDEPS, at least until it reaches Congress. As noted earlier, the PPBES process 
as it operates now would be discarded entirely, replaced by a process of long-range 
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As for the acquisition planning and decision process, all work that is not 
involved in program execution would be performed by the staffs of the USD AT&L, 
Joint staff and the MILDEP secretariats and military side of the departments, but by 
far fewer staff with far fewer reviews by succession of committees. As one former 
senior program manager told us, "If you want to get a decision in the Pentagon, don't 
try to do it by committee. Someone has to be responsible for decisions and held 
accountable accordingly."  
One of the ways to streamline the DAS process is to eliminate duplicative 
reviews of program proposals by successive committees that tend to ask the same 
questions but cannot resist the proclivity to add to program complexity by requesting 
new and previously non-existent requirements to weapons platforms and systems. 
Often such add-ons appear to be motivated by the desire of military officers to 
enhance their careers through recommendation of additional requirements as a 
"career accomplishment" rather than based on evidence that add-ons are essential 
to mission performance. The cost of successive add-ons is increased program and 
budget turbulence and instability, plus a lot of additional work to accommodate or 
reject the proposed change by program sponsors. 
Another factor that inevitably slows down system acquisition analysis and 
decision-making is the competition and sometimes strong disagreement between 
different parts of the MILDEPS (e.g., between OPNAV and systems commands in 
the Navy), and within organizations—including systems commands. One military 
program manager we interviewed said, "I knew politics would be a major part of this 
job but I thought the source of problems would be Congress [...] but I spend much 
more time 'politicking' to keep my program alive within my own [systems] command 
and with OPNAV than with Congress by far."   He stressed that he had to obtain 
multiple approvals even for "minor decisions I should be able to make myself" from 
multiple levels within his systems command and in OPNAV, which slowed down the 
progress of his program and which made it more difficult to keep it on schedule and, 
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Another part of the problem as we see it is that in the current system, DOD 
asks too much of contractors relative to their incentive to take work in the first place, 
and perform well on contracts once they are awarded. We address this issue at the 
conclusion of this section. 
An Example of a Simplified Acquisition Process 
To gain perspective on proposals for simplification, redesign and 
reengineering opportunities, we may observe first that the acquisition process may 
be divided into four basic stages: concept and technology development, system 
development and demonstration, production and deployment, and operations and 
support (sustainment).  
Second, we observe that the questions that have to be answered to acquire a 
weapons platform or system are relatively simple in the abstract: (1) What does the 
entity responsible for acquiring an asset want, and why? (2) How does the intended 
user of the asset want to use it? (3) What does the asset need to do in terms of 
performance? (Dillard, 2007). (4) How much money do we have to acquire the 
asset? Answering these basic questions is not nearly as easy as asking them. 
Third, the participant roles in the process and functions to be performed have 
remained relatively the same (but have become much more complex) since the 
beginning of the nation. Generally speaking, these roles and functions are performed 
in nine sequential steps: (1) some entity identifies a capability request; (2) the 
capability identified has to be validated initially as a legitimate requirement; (3) a 
weapons platform or weapons system (e.g., equipment) has to be designed to meet 
the validated capability requirement; (4) DOD contracts for development, test and 
evaluation, which is intended to and often does lead to design improvements; this 
work is performed by firms that want to compete for the right to produce and sell the 
asset to the government; (5) the acquisition of the asset has to be planned 
(programmed in DOD terms) and then proposed in the defense budget sent to 
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asset; (6) DOD performs the role of buyer from the private sector using myriad 
management tools for soliciting initial proposals (RFPs), evaluating bids and 
eventually selecting of the supplier(s). It then contracts for the R&D, prototypes and 
other work required to develop the prototype; (7) DOD evaluates the asset and 
decides whether to move forward in to full-scale production; (8) the builder/producer 
must determine how best to manufacture the asset and supply it to DOD within a 
highly comprehensive and typically tight set of constraints over design, cost, 
schedule etc.; (9) assets are delivered to DOD and provided (deployed) to the user, 
i.e., the warfighters.  
The components of the acquisition process that we point to as candidates for 
redesign and reengineering cut across all of these functional stages identified above, 
although we give less attention to the user phase. Still, we do suggest several new 
proposals with respect to fielding of weapons systems, as we indicate subsequently. 
We envision a significantly reengineered and simplified acquisition decision and 
execution process. However, as experienced observers will note, some of what we 
advocate is already implemented in DOD, but perhaps not quite in the way we 
envision it in the model that follows. To illustrate what we advocate, we provide as 
an example a simplified version (organized into seven main phases) of what a 
redesigned and reengineered acquisition process would consist. 
The Jones-McCaffery Model for Acquisition System Redesign and 
Reengineering 
1. The initial phase is proposal of a desired capability by the military 
departments and services. This proposal could come from a warfighter command or, 
more centrally, from the military chiefs (e.g., from OPNAV or elsewhere in the Navy). 
The staff of the MILDEP acquisition secretariat would comprehensively review and 
analyze the proposal; then, the service assistant secretary for acquisition would 
make a decision on whether to proceed with its development (advanced 
development latter phase). Information on requirements from the COCOMs (where 
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decision-makers are assured to the extent possible that the proposed systems meet 
a real warfighter need. 
This first phase assumes implicitly that the military services have a clear idea 
of what they want, even at the operational capabilities level.  However, we note that 
a number of experienced acquisition practitioners have identified the requirements 
process as one of the weaknesses of defense acquisition.  As one seasoned former 
program manager put it, "In my opinion, this [inability to define requirements 
adequately] is due primarily to: (a) a chronic deficiency of human capital, (b) a 
dysfunctional and complicated bureaucratic structure, and (c) a perpetual desire to 
mix needs with prescribed solutions."  Another highly experienced critic put it more 
bluntly, "Do you assume that the war fighter or the military departments and services 
really know what they want?"  
We acknowledge the potential and real weaknesses that exist presently in 
defining what asset should be acquired for the warfighter. Our first response is that 
the shift to identifying and specifying the capability desired rather than the specifics 
of asset performance requirements that has taken place in DOD as a result of 
transformation over the past five years or so is a step in the right direction to improve 
the requirements-setting process. Secondly, we propose a check should exist in the 
second phase of our redesigned process model to weed out poorly defined 
capability requests and requirements proposals. This would be (and is now) part of 
the responsibility initially of the MILDEP acquisition professionals and then of the 
USD AT&L and JCS. This is not a significant departure from how business is 
performed presently. However, we wish to point to the statement of USD AT&L John 
Young, Jr. included below indicating that improvements are needed to state 
capabilities more clearly, to define requirement more carefully, and to kill-off bad 
proposals earlier in the process (Dillard, 2006). 
2. The MILDEP request for the capability and a specific system to meet the 
capability requirement would be analyzed simultaneously and together by a 
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recommendation issued together to USD AT&L for decision. The USD AT&L would 
decide on a "go or no go" basis to approve or disapprove the "capabilities and 
system request," and this decision would represent the choice of the Secretary of 
Defense, as is the case presently. No separate review by SECDEF would be made, 
except where the Secretary took the initiative to do so. It is presumed that some 
necessarily approximate design requirement and some specifications would be 
determined by this stage in the process. Still, many issues with respect to feasibility 
of design, engineering, technological feasibility and cost would inevitably remain to 
be resolved subsequently. However, we agree with Under Secretary Young in 
stressing that the culture of "just move it along" in initially approving the capability 
and requirement has to be changed. Too many asset proposals are approved for 
development by the MILDEPS, and this absence of discipline is as much a cultural 
phenomenon as it is a failure to perform work diligently. If the MILDEP culture 
endorses the "let's fly it up the flag pole and see who salutes" approach, then 
insufficient screening results in wasted time and energy as less desirable systems 
are assessed. This, in turn, takes time away from analysis and development of 
systems that are really needed. As Mr. Young put it, "troubled programs share 
common traits [...] programs were initiated with inadequate technology maturity and 
[without] an elementary understanding of the critical program development path." 
This type of error has to be eliminated, and such discipline will become increasingly 
necessary as money for DOD weapons acquisition declines (as it will inevitably do 
based on historical analysis of the peaks and valleys for defense funding).  
3. Once a "capabilities and systems request" was approved by USD AT&L, 
the MILDEPS would request the private sector prepare and submit design and R&D 
proposals. The responses from private firms would include bids for their designs, 
including costs for meeting the required capability and system requirements. Again, 
this is not much different than what is done in acquisition and contracting presently, 
with the exception that no R&D would be assigned to government labs. All R&D 
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competition for the right to produce would be open to US as well as non-US firms 
from selected foreign nations.  
4. Then, first, the MILDEP program office, and second, a committee or board 
representing the combined staffs of the USD AT&L, the Joint Chiefs and the 
MILDEPS would review private-sector proposals, each of which would contain the 
design specifications determined by the private firms and the costs estimated to 
meet the requirement with a specific platform, system or equipment asset. The 
second step, the combined review which would include the JCS analysis of 
inoperability, would result in the recommendation to USD AT&L of one or more 
contractors for prototype production and related R&D, or that more bids be solicited 
if none of the bids are deemed satisfactory. Notably, this recommendation would be 
made by the MILDEP acquisition executive.  
While the analysis performed during this phase would involve participants 
representing a number of stakeholders, the primary agent responsible for analysis 
would be the MILDEP staff. Still, the final decision authority to move forward on a 
system must rest solely with the USD AT&L. The USD AT&L and staff would assess 
the recommendation from the single (not multiple) combined committee and staff 
review of proposals and decide on which to accept and which to reject. Ultimately, in 
any organization, final decision authority and accountability for asset acquisition 
decision-making has to be assigned to one official. This principle is firmly imbedded 
in the lessons derived from effective corporate management in the private sector. 
Management by committee is not management at all. Rather, it is a recipe for 
error—just as is excessive and duplicative reviews of systems leading up to the point 
of decision. In this respect, DOD systems, structures and work processes are weak 
and wasteful. Too many duplicative reviews by too many entities are performed with 
the result that it takes longer to reach a decision. 
5. The next step in the process would be preparing and issuing the contracts 
for prototype production, and for additional RDT&E where needed. The types of 
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determined (as we explain elsewhere in this report) based on what is appropriate 
relative to the capability and system characteristics we identify. Both fixed and 
flexible price contracts would be used and, as is the case now, the tendency would 
be to use flexible and incentive-based contracts (with strict penalties for failure to 
perform within cost and time constraints written into the contract) for programs in 
which uncertainty is higher at the front-end of development (in complex systems for 
example). Then, as system designs and characteristics became known and the 
system moved toward and into production, the program office would move to fixed-
price contracts, in which uncertainty was reduced. As is the case presently, after bid 
and award of contracts, most of the technical and financial risks involved from 
design through production are assumed by the private sector.  
With respect to funding, RDT&E and the latter phases of design and then 
production would be paid for using appropriations made by Congress—nothing new 
here, as this is a Constitutional requirement. However, because in this model we 
assume adoption of a capital budget by DOD, financing for acquisition would be 
provided from the capital investment fund, and the term of financing would depend 
on the needs of the government and the contractor. The primary objective of the 
CAF would be to stabilize the funding and budget process for weapons and system 
development, acquisition and deployment. Money to fund the DOD CAF would be 
appropriated by Congress as is the case presently, e.g., by different types of 
appropriation (i.e., different colors of money) through the regular appropriation 
process. However, money thus appropriated would be deposited into different 
accounts within the CAF according to color-of-money requirements and restrictions 
provided by Congress. Again, this would not cause Congress to have to make any 
change in the way it appropriates money for DOD acquisition.  
With respect to political considerations, it is highly evident to us that CAF 
would work best for DOD if Congress would provide funding with maximum flexibility, 
e.g., with "no-year" end dates, extended time for obligation, higher thresholds for 
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would delegate some between-appropriation transfer authority to DOD, subject to 
reporting to but not approval by Congress. We might argue the advantages to 
Congress of adopting accrual budgeting (which would provide multiple-year and 
forward funding for acquisition to replace the annual appropriations budget that 
Congress prefers), but we acknowledge that Congress is unlikely to ever accept this 
approach to budgeting, although it is commonplace in the private sector. This 
reluctance stems from the fact, regrettable at times, that Congress tends to be more 
concerned with where money is spent and who gets DOD contracts for production of 
warfare assets than it is with the efficiency of the DOD acquisition process, the 
performance of program management, or the productivity of the private sector. 
However, if Congress genuinely wants DOD to provide stable financing for 
acquisition, then members must realize that DOD needs help from them to do so 
(see more on this area under the politics of reform section of this report). 
The CAF approach would require a very different system of financing and 
accounting for appropriation by DOD. As we have recommended, DOD would use a 
longer-term budget and resource management system in which financial obligations 
for acquiring assets would be managed and accounted for on a full accrual basis, 
using a separate capital budget to support the financing of systems acquisition. For 
this to work, the period for obligation should be extended for all money deposited 
into the CAF, as we have proposed. Under the most desirable circumstances, DOD 
would request that Congress appropriate what constitute capital outlay 
appropriations (to buy long-lived assets) on a "no year" basis as explained above, 
i.e., with no end-year specified. This would enable DOD CAF managers to provide 
much more stability to program managers for system development, acquisition and 
deployment than is the case at present. 
6. The private sector would be required to perform additional design work, if 
necessary, to produce the final asset prototype (with all of the technical and 
performance attributes intended for the asset) once put into full-scale production. 
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terms of performance and cost—in the contractor's production facilities. This is 
similar to the current process often employed, but would be conducted with more 
emphasis on product performance and schedule in addition to cost in order to meet 
the required program capability requirement. The private sector would supply DOD 
with prototype models ready, in basic form at least, to test and evaluate realistically 
for fielding. This final prototype would be jointly and simultaneously tested by the 
contractor and the PM team on behalf of DOD. Under the conditions of the contract, 
DOD would have the option to accept or reject the asset. To reemphasize the point, 
the primary responsibility for satisfying DOD's role and responsibility in test and 
evaluation would be performed by the MILDEPS program management staff (herein 
referred to as the contract team), as is much the case now, but with oversight by a 
single representative from the combined USD AT&L and Joint staff review 
committee. The purpose of this oversight is to provide another "back-up" check to 
balance the system in evaluating the prototype. Thus, at this point, a combined 
member-evaluation contract team (consisting of the PM and staff, the USD AT&L, 
JCS and the contractor) would work together in one place at one time to evaluate 
the asset. 
We propose, in addition, contracting for multiple competing prototypes along 
with evaluation through collaboration of government and industry teams. This is a 
component of reform that has received strong support at the DOD executive level. In 
a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the 
JCS, Commander of US Special Forces Command and Directors of Defense 
Agencies dated September 19, 2007, Acting USD AT&L John Young, Jr., wrote: 
Many troubled programs share common traits—the programs were initiated 
with inadequate technology maturity and an elementary understanding of the 
critical program development path. Specifically, program decisions were 
based largely on paper proposals that provided inadequate knowledge of 
technical risk and a weak foundation for estimating development and 
procurement cost. The Department must rectify these situations. Lessons of 
the past, and the recommendations of multiple reviews, including the Packard 
Commission report, emphasize the need for, and benefits of, quality 
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System Design and Development (SDD) phase. During SDD, large teams 
should be producing detailed manufacturing designs—not solving myriad 
technical issues. Government and industry teams must work together to 
demonstrate the key knowledge elements that can inform future development 
and budget decisions. To implement this approach, the Military Services and 
Defense Agencies will formulate all pending and future programs with 
acquisition strategies and funding that provide for two or more competing 
teams producing prototypes through Milestone (MS) B. Competing teams 
producing prototypes of key system elements will reduce technical risk, 
validate designs, validate cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, 
and refine requirements. In total, this approach will also reduce time to 
fielding. Beyond these key merits, program strategies defined with multiple, 
competing prototypes provide a number of secondary benefits. First, these 
efforts exercise and develop government and industry management teams. 
Second, the prototyping efforts provide and opportunity to develop and 
enhance system engineering skills. Third, the programs provide a method to 
exercise and retain certain critical core engineering skills in the government 
and our industrial base [...] Based on these considerations, all acquisition 
strategies requiring USD(AT&L) approval must be formulated to include 
competitive, technically mature prototyping through MS B. (Young, 2007, p. 1) 
We presume that, under our proposal, some bids and, consequently, 
prototypes would come from non-US firms (see our recommendations on the Buy 
America Act and similar laws that have been passed by Congress which would have 
to be either repealed or modified to permit non-US firms to participate as we 
recommend).  
At this point in the process, the PM-led contract team and all other DOD test 
and evaluation participants would be constrained to requesting only very minimal 
changes to the asset prototype produced by the private firm. Significantly, changes 
would be held to a strict cost constraint based on a specified percentage of the 
projected per-unit cost of the asset once it entered full-scale production (best guess 
estimate of "should cost") and would only be approved if the contractor could 
complete minor modifications within 90 to 120 days. The MILDEP PM would have 
responsibility, assisted by the acquisition team, for testing (along with the contractor) 
any modifications allowed under the contract once the modified prototype was 
available for further test and evaluation. Once such T&E was completed, the PM 
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authority and the USD AT&L whether to move to contracting for full-scale production. 
In this respect, we want to empower the PM beyond what is authorized within the 
existing DAS. 
7. Once accepted by the PM, in consultation with his/her contract team, the 
contract to move into full-scale production would be awarded and the purchase 
funded. For this to happen quickly, simultaneous alignment of the DAS and the 
financing process is required—as we recommend under capital budgeting. With 
respect to final DOD decision authority, the USD AT&L would be required to approve 
the proposal for contracting for full-scale production. In addition, as Jacques Gansler 
has suggested, we would place the Assistant Secretary for Networks and 
Information Integration (N&II) under the USD AT&L (which would change the USD's 
title to IAT&L) "to emphasize the importance of information-centric systems, both for 
warfare and for infrastructure" (Gansler, 2007, p. 15).  What we intend at this point is 
essentially direct contact between the PM and the USD AT&L or someone fully 
authorized and designated on his staff to give final approval. The role of the MILDEP 
acquisition decision authority would be to step in only to terminate a program. As 
one former senior program manager put it, "It is never too late to kill a program." And 
this dictum should apply to the full-scale production phase that follows final DOD 
approval for movement to full-scale production. Thus, stopping programs such as 
the infamous Navy A-12 aircraft or the Army Crusader should be regarded as the 
norm rather than the exception. When program failure is imminent, allowing the 
decision to terminate it to drag out for years simply wastes money and work effort 
that should be applied to programs for which the need is highly apparent. 
The CAF would supply a stable base for funding production of a specified 
quantity of the asset. No changes in the design, engineering or technology of the 
asset would be permitted during the initial production run. While this to some extent 
deviates from the principles of continuous improvement and spiral acquisition, such 
control is necessary to protect the contractor from constant changes that, while they 
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schedules to slip and increase costs beyond "should cost" government estimates, 
contractor estimates upon which bids were tendered, and the amount of funding 
made available for procurement—i.e., as evidenced by the perennial cost over-runs 
that Congress, GAO and even DOD deride (on assessing the risks of spiral 
development see Dillard & Ford, 2007). 
8. The final phase of the redesigned acquisition process would be acceptance 
of the asset by the warfighter commands as meeting a required capability—through 
official certification by the appropriate COCOM (more than one COCOM could be 
involved in this certification). If the warfighter rejected an asset as not meeting 
capability requirements, or for reasons of poor or non-performance, DOD would 
have the authority—prescribed previously within full production contracts—to require 
a repayment (i.e., a penalty) to the Treasury of a portion of the production contract 
funding received by the contractor. This innovation to the overall acquisition system 
would require passage of new legislation by Congress authorizing such action by 
DOD. Also, it is clear that contractors would not support such legislation giving DOD 
so much leverage to reject deployed assets combined with a repayment penalty. 
However, if the goal of the acquisition and financing process is to field systems that 
meet warfighter needs, this type of legislation is needed to assure complete 
accountability for assets performance by contractors.   
In addition, because contractor expertise typically is required in training and 
supervision of the use of the asset by warfighters in some instances, a separate 
contract would be entered into under circumstances on an as-needed basis. This 
contract would finance all or part of the cost of fielding and training with the clear 
requirement that all assets be fully supported by user manuals, other documentation 
and required software where applicable prior to the point of installation on existing 
platforms (in the case of system replacement or augmentation) or the fielding of new 
platforms or systems. Under the current financing and fielding process, RDT&E 
money cannot be used for anything beyond installation. Technically, training of the 
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or production appropriations. However, the advantage of the CAF is that funding 
stability for training and installation would be paid for from an existing pool of money 
for this purpose. This aspect of the CAF would require Congress to appropriate 
funds specifically for such types of contracts and contractor work.  
How would the more rapid progress of weapons system RDT&E, 
development, and the rest of the process be tracked by USD AT&L, the Joint Staff 
and especially the MILDEP program management team? As we have explained in 
this report, this should be done using a single, integrated computer system for US 
AT&L and each of the MILDEPS. RDT&E would be performed by the private 
contractors as is, to a significant extent, the case presently.  
We acknowledge fully that the redesigned and simplified process example 
outlined above is just that, an outline of one approach to a reengineered process. 
Additional analysis is needed to determine how the process would be implemented 
beyond what we have stipulated and what parts of the existing acquisition process 
would be molded to fit with the reengineered process. Without passage of new 
legislation by Congress, this last element of the reengineered process could not be 
implemented by DOD. 
In evaluating the process outlined here, one could ask an obvious question: 
when there is so little incentive for private sector contractors to bid and perform work 
for DOD, wouldn't many of the elements we suggest further reduce this incentive? 
What would stimulate the five major US defense contractors to continue to want to 
maintain their defense lines of products and this part of their highly diversified 
businesses? Part of the answer to this question is greater reliance on competition in 
a global marketplace and more off-the-shelf buying by DOD. If large domestic 
contractor firms decided to abandon their defense business, we presume this would 
create opportunity for non-US contractors. Further, our proposal could create 
incentives for US defense firms to seek joint ventures with non-US firms. We 
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Contracts, Risk and Accommodation of Uncertainty 
We are aware that there is a whole layer of contracting and contract 
management that must take place to cause private firms to bid to meet DOD RDT&E 
and asset acquisition needs.  
In addressing the topic of contracting and instrumentation, we recognize that 
the complexity of contracting has to take into account that risk and uncertainty are 
related to the types of contracts used to acquire services and assets from the private 
sector (Thompson & Jones, 1986). We understand the principle that where risk and 
uncertainty are high, flexible price and incentive-type contracts are the best tools for 
getting the performance desired from contractors. In contrast, where risks are lower, 
because of less uncertainty, fixed-price contracts may be employed usefully.  
As is the case under current practice, DOD has to be careful to apply the type 
of contract tools that are matched to the nature of the performance required under a 
contract. But this is only part of the equation. As explained by Thompson and Jones 
(1986), the choice of management control system used by DOD has to be matched 
to the nature of the market (competitive versus non-competitive), the nature of the 
asset to be acquired (homogeneous or heterogeneous; known versus unknown 
product characteristics), and the level of uncertainty and risk (low versus high) 
involved from R&D to production and eventual fielding of the assets. The 
advantages of fixed-price contracts are in most cases obvious, e.g., where COTS is 
applied to contract for purchase of an asset that already has been produced and is 
available for purchase without modification. Further, where flexible-price contracts 
are used to appropriately to accommodate uncertainty and risk, it is highly 
advantageous for PMs to build-in incentives to stimulate contractor performance, 
e.g., incentive bonuses. However, when this and similar approaches are used (and 
this approach has been employed very successfully by DOD), it is necessary to 
make sure that the incentive to perform on one part of the contract (e.g., producing 
an improved radar system on time) does not draw energy and attention away from 
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We also acknowledge neglect to some extent of logistics reform in our model, 
although we can make reference to the significant advances in spiral logistics and 
adoption of new systems. Such advances contribute to the task of meeting 
warfighter needs quickly and efficiently and should be applauded. We note in this 
regard how DOD has applied private-sector methods along with smart practices 
employed within DOD in reforming logistics processes and practices. Such 
advances reinforce the supposition that acquisition and related financial 
management reforms also can be modeled to an extent on private business 
practices, and that reform initiatives can succeed given appropriate design and 
implementation, sufficient executive support, and time to mature. 
Additional Consequences of Redesign and Reengineering 
In a significantly redesigned and reengineered acquisition process, several 
additional and major changes should be made as a consequence of reform. For 
example, as indicated, all government R&D laboratories that perform defense work 
would be eliminated because the work they perform can be obtained from private 
labs at lower cost. Likewise, some relatively unused or under-used government 
production facilities would be closed and terminated, e.g., Navy shipyards that never 
build ships and could not out-perform private yards in terms of price and schedule if 
required to operate on a non-subsidized basis and level playing field. In this regard, 
moving shipyards to mission funding and away from working capital funding, as has 
been done to some extent in the Navy, removes any incentives to increase 
productivity that might have been present before this change was made. 
Additionally, some of the work performed by the MILDEP system commands 
would be redefined if more systems are bought off-the-shelf rather than made 
(contracted for) by these commands. This is not to conclude that all work performed 
by systems command is unnecessary.  In fact, just the opposite is the case. We 
advocate that increased authority to match responsibility be provided to MILDEP 
program managers. Still, if DOD moves further towards a "buy" rather than "make" 
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the last section of this report, then less work related to the "make" approach to 
acquisition would be available to be performed by system commands. As Gansler 
has put it, "The DoD must shift from a 'supply push' system to a 'demand pull' 
system based on 'sense and respond' and secure I.T. (for ‘total asset visibility’)” 
(Gansler, 2007, p. 26). 
Smart Practice Examples 
One approach to determining how to reform acquisition not explored in this 
text to any great extent is to review carefully what has worked with successful 
acquisition programs. One example is the Navy DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class AEGIS 
guided missile destroyer program. Originally designed to defend against Soviet 
aircraft, cruise missiles, and nuclear attack submarines, this higher-capability ship is 
used in high-threat areas to conduct anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface, and strike 
operations. The mission of the Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 is to conduct sustained 
combat operations at sea, providing primary protection for Navy aircraft carriers and 
battle groups, as well as essential escort for Navy and Marine Corps amphibious 
forces and auxiliary ships, and to perform independent operations as necessary. 
These ships contain myriad offensive and defensive weapons designed to support 
maritime defense needs well into the 21st Century. The DDG 51 was the first Navy 
ship designed to incorporate shaping techniques to reduce radar cross-section—
thus reducing detectability and the likelihood of being targeted by enemy weapons 
and sensors. DDG 51s were constructed in flights, allowing technological advances 
during construction (Global Security, 2007).  
The DDG-51 acquisition program is a “smart practice” example of successful 
acquisition in that it was: (a) managed within cost, (b) came in on schedule, and (c) 
met warfighter requirements. Causal factors included: (a) experienced and 
consistent PM leadership, (b) good program management teamwork, (c) clear 
identification of requirements and what the platform was supposed to do, (d) good 
relations between the PM office and contractors, (e) a highly competent contractor, 
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the program by the PM and Navy to DOD and on the Hill. As one high-level Navy 
official who headed the PM office said about the program, "The DDG-51 acquisition 
was managed by a highly motivated and dedicated government-industry team with 
extremely clear lines of communication. The PM was charged with 'cradle to grave' 
management of entire system (ship and all the weapons on it). The DDG-51 was the 
first ship built from the keel up as an entirely integrated weapons system. In terms of 
cost and schedule, costs were well-contained from the beginning but the schedule 
for first ship was unrealistic and a contract modification was needed to deal with this 
problem. We made that happen with full involvement of the Secretariat, the Navy 
uniformed leadership and the Hill" (Greene, 2007).  For another view on improving 
the system, see Appendix B that summarizes recommendations from a Rand 
Corporation study on reducing the costs of Navy shipbuilding.  
In conclusion, we maintain that the DAS (as it functions presently) is not 
broken as much as it is abused by too much process, too many work steps and too 
many participants that force too many changes that increase costs and time to 
production and fielding. Steps in the process that do not add more value than cost 
need to be eliminated. Participation in the decision process purely for the sake of 
participation is wasteful and results in myriad negative consequences. When Deputy 
Secretary of Defense England called for simplification (England, 2007), for 
acquisition professionals, this meant—pure and simple—that some procedural steps 
and the philosophy of review, re-review and then re-review again had to be stopped. 
Some stakeholders who participate in the acquisition review and decision process 
need to be removed, and there is no reason to expect they will like this change.  
As Wildavsky observed long ago, change in political and managerial decision 
processes inevitably produces winners and losers (Wildavsky, 1964). The 
continuous addition of new requirements to systems ultimately causes schedules to 
slip and costs to rise inordinately. In execution, PMs need greater stability. This 
means they need fewer changes in the programs they are managing, and they need 
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production problems emerge that cannot be corrected without incurring greater costs 
than benefits, e.g., as with the A-12 aircraft program. And while virtually all 
observers continue to applaud the value of continuous improvement through spiral 
acquisition, several questions always need to be addressed. First, how much will the 
proposed additional change add to cost and time to delivery? Second, is the 
integration of new and better technology (e.g., software for example) worth adding 
two years and $10 million to system costs? Third, how much change is too much for 
program managers and contractors to accommodate within cost and schedule 
constraints? Such questions are invariably linked with the greater stability in the 
acquisition system that all seem to favor, at least in principle.  
These observations are not new, but now they need to be heeded; this is our 
primary point. As we have noted, the acquisition system isn't broken, but it is horribly 
abused for careerist, bureaucratic and private purposes. The result is that weapons 
and equipment take far too long to field and cost too much. Too often, fewer units 
are procured than are needed or products that have consumed considerable 
financial resources are never delivered to the warfighter. 
We fully concede that the type of business process redesign and 
reengineering reform we advocate is unlikely, on its own, to correct much of what is 
deficient in DOD acquisition, contracting and financial management bureaucracy. 
We believe major changes are needed to improve what is done now internally within 
DOD and in concert with private-sector defense contractors. We assert that much 
work now done within government could and should be performed almost entirely 
outside of government. If one accepts the viability of this assertion, the questions 
then become, “How would these different approaches to reform be put into practice, 
and what are the implications of each in terms of changing existing DOD 
organization and business processes?”  We have attempted to address a variety of 
issues in our analysis, but we accept criticism to the effect that implementing the 
type of change we advocate is more complicated and faces more hurdles than we 
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least in part, as we write. Other suggestions are beyond the range of political or 
organizational acceptability at present. Some of our proposals simply may be ill-
advised. In defense, we assert that what we have tried to accomplish in analysis of 
acquisition process redesign, reengineering and simplification is provided to 
stimulate more thinking and dialogue on reform within and outside of DOD in the 
broader acquisition community of practice. 
Finally, in recommending acquisition system redesign, process restructuring 
and reengineering, we want to go on record in stating that increased use of 
contractors to perform what are essentially government functions has gone too far 
and needs to be reduced dramatically. We advocate continued outsourcing of only 
what we and others deem to be essentially non-governmental work. Whether this 
means that government employment should increase correspondingly depends 
entirely on the continued need for the types of work that have been outsourced over 
the past decade and the politics of the budgetary process. Finally, with respect to 
acquisition reform, we recommend beyond redesign and reengineering of business 
processes an increased use of commercial off-the-shelf acquisition and 
procurement, relying more extensively than at present on an international 
marketplace instead of buying almost exclusively from domestic producers. To this 
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Globalization of Defense Acquisition 
The Department of Defense should take greater advantage of the competitive 
dynamics of an international defense capital asset market in the same way that large 
firms in the private sector currently operate. As Jacques Gansler has explained: 
The Security world has changed dramatically—especially since 9/11/01 
(geopolitically, technologically, threats, missions, warfighting, commercially, 
etc.) [...] However, the Defense Industrial Structure, the controlling policies, 
practices, laws, and the Services’ budgets and “requirements” priorities have 
not been transformed to match the needs of this new world. (Gansler, 2007, 
p. 3) 
We see the need for transition to a system in which, as noted, the product is 
the exclusive focus of decision effort. If one accepts the potential viability of this 
approach, the questions then become, “How would this be done? How would such a 
system operate, and what are the most important issues to be resolved in privatizing 
DOD weapons systems acquisition?” In our analysis, we take into account how 
contemporary business corporations operate, compete and, at times, cooperate 
presently in a global marketplace. We argue that to operate defense acquisition in a 
more business-like manner, decision-makers must understand the forces and 
market dynamics that have caused the corporate sector all over the world to adopt 
new forms of structure, behavior and performance. The Department of Defense 
needs to take advantage of competition in the emerging global marketplace. As 
Gansler has noted, there is now, "A 'globalized defense market' [to enable] 
technology transfer with allies and buying from the best—with proper risk-based 
concern regarding security" (Gansler, 2007, p. 12).  What is needed in terms of the 
characteristics of the most desirable defense industrial base in the mid-21st Century 
is, among other things, an acquisition strategy that, "draws fully on commercial and 
global technologies" (Gansler, 2007, p. 11). 
We assert that the key advantage of the global acquisition reform approach is 
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asset market. The DOD should operate the same way as large firms in the private 
sector rather than relying on the system and process it uses now—which is, in 
essence, a gigantic, disconnected and inherently ineffective government 
bureaucracy. This structure resembles in form the Cold War-era, Soviet-style, long-
range planning hierarchy in which the process becomes the product. We argue for a 
transition to a system in which the product is the focus of decision effort. As stated 
above, if one accepts the potential viability of this assertion, the questions then 
becomes, “How would this be done? How would such a system operate, and what 
are the most important issues to be resolved in privatizing DOD weapons systems 
acquisition?” 
For DOD, the basic argument we advance is movement towards a “buy” 
rather than “make” acquisition strategy in most cases, and that the DOD should try 
to buy COTS weaponry, systems and equipment not just from US firms, but from the 
international marketplace. If most warfighting assets were bought in this way, the 
planning, building, contracting and execution of DOD tasks would be profoundly 
reduced, and the acquisition part of the organization would learn significant lessons 
Proper execution of this approach to eliminate non-value-added work so as to 
increase time devoted to high-value-added tasks is the key. Further, we advocate 
eliminating or outsourcing to the private sector all work that is not core governmental 
in kind. Indeed, we have indicated in this report why and how business process 
reform should be applied and roughly how much of the DOD acquisition bureaucracy 
should be cut.  These conclusions and recommendations also apply to those we 
have made relative to the abandonment of PPBES and adoption of long-range 
capital and performance-based budgeting and resource management. Where steps 
and stages of the work process are eliminated from the existing, highly 
cumbersome, DOD resource-planning and budgeting processes, the workforce 
should be reduced accordingly. 
We believe that DOD should consider the “buy vs. make” decision to a much 
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approach now in some instances. The Marine Corps bought the Harrier aircraft from 
the UK long ago. The Army is buying a helicopter from Australia; the Marine Corps 
acquired a fast-moving marine troop carrier vessel based on an existing Australian 
boat design, and members of Congress, including Senator John McCain (R-AZ) 
have suggested that the Air Force consider competition for refueling aircraft 
acquisition from Airbus in addition to Boeing. Many other examples abound which 
illustrate that the US military is buying equipment from foreign nations. 
We would advocate that DOD further consider acquiring major warfighting 
assets such as strategic and tactical aircraft, missiles, ships, submarines, tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, trucks and the rest from overseas producers. As we 
have explained, DOD should take advantage of competition and even create such 
competition for supply in the international marketplace, much as it has done in the 
past in the US defense industry. And just as international corporations have moved 
production offshore, the US defense industry can move offshore (some already have 
done so) to take advantage of lower labor costs so as to compete for business from 
DOD.  Further, our proposal would create an incentive for US defense firms to 
consider joint ventures with foreign firms.  
If DOD can buy an existing platform or system that supplies the required 
capability from abroad at a lower cost, why should it continue to support what has 
become essentially monopolistic supply from US firms? Economic theory teaches us 
that monopolists eventually will set prices too high and will under-produce to exploit 
their monopoly position. Over the past fifteen or so years, the US defense industry 
has consolidated through merger and acquisition to the effect that three large firms 
dominate the market. They have argued that such strategy was and is necessary for 
them to survive and make a profit. We do not dispute these claims. However, we do 
dispute that DOD is better off buying weaponry and supporting systems and 
equipment from an oligopolistic market when we know from economics that such 
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The reform to have DOD acquire weapons systems from the international 
marketplace is not advanced in ignorance of the very real concerns related to the 
security risks associated with buying from foreign firms. Espionage is a concern both 
domestically and abroad, and the standard assumption is that the risks are higher 
abroad than at home. We think that achieving security anywhere in the world, given 
some obvious constraints in some nations, is a matter of how much is invested to 
achieve it and how it is managed so that all security risks are addressed. In our view, 
if the same security precautions are taken with all firms, foreign and domestic, then 
we do not see the differences between risks overall. This assumes that the US buys 
assets from allies who have a mutual stake in cooperative security arrangements in 
their regions of the world. For example, we do not expect that the US would buy 
medium- or long-range missiles from China, although it could. But could the US buy 
submarines or ships from South Korea? Most critics would answer that this is not 
possible, but is that necessarily the case if an asset produced by a foreign firm most 
cost-effectively met the capability requirements of the US military?  The longer-term 
nature of the security relationships between nations will always govern who does 
business with whom in international markets.  
A similar concern with our globalization approach is related to the consistent 
and long-term availability of spare parts and customer support, e.g., for software. 
Our concerns for software are mitigated by the view that all software for warfighting 
platforms and systems would have to be developed and supported by US firms, 
partly out of security requirements and partly so that competition for software 
development and upgrading would remain relatively open. Further, in our vision of 
how capital budgeting would operate on a longer-term and accrual basis, part of the 
way in which supply of spares is ensured is that PMs buy what is needed up-front 
with the purchase of the major weapons asset as part of the same contract. Would 
this not build-in intentional obsolescence sooner than needed if upgrades and new 
systems are developed by the supplying firm and as the system and equipment 
needs of the US military change? Would international buying create a situation in 
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situation exists for DOD and the military presently. Indeed, we do not see how 
buying under conditions in which there is more competition to provoke innovation to 
meet US defense needs is greater than at present. If markets are allowed to work as 
they should, where demand exists, supply emerges to meet the demand. Will this 
always be the case? Not necessarily, nor is there any guarantee that requirements 
and capability will remain stable. In fact, the virtual assurance of change in the threat 
environment and, consequently, in capabilities required argues for the advantage of 
markets as adaptive mechanisms to lead technology development and availability in 
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The Politics of Reform 
We recall the statement by former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney (who 
presided over one of the largest cutbacks in weapons system programs, stopping 
more programs under development than had ever been done before—even after 
WWII and the Viet Nam war) (Jones & Bixler, 1992, pp. 129-171). When asked 
about the effects of such sweeping cuts, Cheney replied that it was not the 
responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to maintain the health and stability of the 
US defense industry. What was implicit in Cheney's observation is that the 
responsibility for advocating the cause of US contractors belongs to the contractors 
themselves, to their lobbyists and, ultimately, to those who represent their interests 
in Congress. 
Critics of the view we advocate point out that Congress would not permit DOD 
to engage in wide-scale international shopping and buying, and they are right—if 
current law is any indication. For example, the Buy America Act prohibits much of 
the type of business with foreign firms that we indicate is needed. Further, as 
Gansler put it: 
[S]ignificant changes must be made in the ITAR, Export Controls, the Berry 
Amendment, [in rules governing] specialty metals, etc. to recognize the [need 
to operate in a] global defense market (with appropriate risk-based 
consideration of security and vulnerability concerns) [...] [and also to] remove 
barriers to commercial firms (e.g., CAS) and encourage their participation (via 
OTA, FAR Part 12, etc.). (Gansler, 2007, pp. 24, 27) 
Thus, for DOD to implement our recommendations, some provisions of these 
and other laws and rules would have to be repealed or modified. Such change is no 
small order of business, and we acknowledge this fact. Congress is interested in 
keeping defense production at home to protect US labor interests and to supply jobs 
for their constituents—in part, because this behavior is what gets members elected 
and reelected. Further, members of Congress do not shirk from adding assets 
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the military have asked and budgeted for these assets or not. Pork barreling in 
support of special interests is endemic in Congress to the extent that it is simply 
business as usual, and DOD is forced to go along with this practice—trading off what 
is needed badly for what is needed less or not at all so as to obtain support for its 
other budget priorities. Further, once a program has been forced into the defense 
budget in Congress, DOD and the military services are co-opted into supporting the 
program in the future. Thus, pork barreling and earmarking of funds for special 
purposes by Congress is something that DOD often supports, e.g., the V-22 aircraft. 
However, at the same time that Congress creates and protects American jobs and 
industry, it rails (assisted by GAO and other audit agents) against DOD for asset 
production cost over-runs, inefficiently low rates of production, failure to set priorities, 
long cycle-time for moving from requirement specification to production and fielding 
of warfighting assets, and general mismanagement and inefficiency. Our point in this 
regard is, as the cartoon character Pogo observed, "We have met the enemy, and 
he is us."  
The acknowledged excesses of democratic decision-making notwithstanding, 
how long can or should the defense acquisition system, the US military and the US 
taxpayer, have to suffer the consequences of what, at best, is congressional and 
DOD waste of money and time in coercion of the process of buying warfighting 
assets, or at worst, behavior that probably is (or should be) criminal—literally—in 
violation of statutory and administrative law? The answer to this question, based on 
historical precedent, is that such practices have been normal in Congress from the 
18th Century and the beginning of the union (McCaffery & Jones, 2001). Why then 
should we demand a change now? Our answer is that Congress and the DOD, as 
well as the rest of the federal government, need to put their money and support 
where their mouths are...in support of the incorporation of better business practices 
in DOD and elsewhere. 
Members of Congress and the Executive branch speak loudly and often about 
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new and did not originate under the initiative of former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld (all Rumsfeld did was try to implement the advice he and other SECDEFs 
had received). Antecedents may be found across the 20th Century in the 
recommendations of Hoover and various other Commissions and special "Blue 
Ribbon" reports (e.g., from the Grace Commission and the Packard Commission in 
the 1980s). Congress has passed innumerable DOD acquisition reform bills into law, 
in theory, to improve DOD efficiency and effectiveness. Congress has approved 
GPRA and GMRA and much similar legislation over the past 20 years, much of it 
aimed at improving government and DOD efficiency, cost consciousness and 
performance. In addition, GAO auditing is used by Congress with the goal of 
improving efficiency.  
Our point is that elected and appointed officials appear to want to be 
perceived as desirous of stimulating efficiency, higher performance and productivity. 
They often speak of the need to "support our fighting forces in the field, particularly 
in time of war.” However, these same officials then perform an about-face when it 
comes to authorization of defense programs and appropriation of defense spending 
authority. Apparently, to paraphrase the famous dictum of President Harry Truman, 
"the buck doesn't stop here." In terms of real accountability for matching word to 
deed, the buck doesn't stop anywhere in the federal government. As we have noted 
elsewhere, the federal budget and process is simultaneously over-controlled and out 
of control. 
Why should we expect Congress to begin to better discipline itself? One 
reason is that Congress has, in fact, adopted self-denying legislation in the recent 
past, e.g., by creating and living with the consequences of the Base Realignment 
and Closure law (in which, at the end of a deliberate process of analysis, Congress 
must accept or reject a list of bases to be closed as an up or down vote, as it did in 
1988,1991,1993,1995 and 2005).  Might we expect similar behavior with respect to 
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What is the likelihood that Congress would, for example, agree to vote without 
any changes, either for or against a capital budget proposal sent to it by the 
President as part of the DOD budget? This is precisely what we recommend be 
done. We suggest that if Congress is faced with an "all or nothing" choice, it will 
make the correct decision just as it has with Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). 
We challenge Congress to pass legislation that creates authority for DOD to prepare 
and submit a capital budget and to approve accompanying legislation that requires a 
congressional vote for or against the acquisition capital budget package submitted to 
it by DOD without changes—exactly as is the case with BRAC. 
Whether or not Congress is willing to do what we suggest is an open 
question. First, members would have to perceive that doing this would somehow 
provide them advantage in the political process. But, it has worked for BRAC, and in 
this process, all members have had to give up something to achieve the desire of 
the whole. Could the same be true for defense acquisition proposals? 
A second area of resistance to the ideas for increased and open market 
competition for DOD business that must be anticipated is that which would emerge 
inevitably from American defense industry and organized labor. We mention this, but 
will not explore it to any extent. Suffice it to say that in a democratic political system, 
all parties have the right of access to the political process to defend their interests—
even if those interests advocate less or no competition, oligopoly and higher versus 
lower labor costs. However, if the market were to dictate the answer to how 
warfighting assets are acquired by DOD, we may draw some conclusions by 
comparing the US defense industry to the US auto industry—i.e., that there may be 
a need to compete with and, in some cases, merge with international competitors to 
survive. And for organized labor, some jobs are better than no jobs. 
Furthermore, DOD does not have to wait for Congress to change the 
annularity that drives how it authorizes, appropriates and performs oversight of its 
program approval and spending roles to begin to change and operate its reformed 
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change its ways—especially those are based on sustaining options and the ability to 
assert priorities in resource allocation due to the incentives of the political system 
(Jones & Bixler, 1992). However, we argue that DOD can restructure and reengineer 
itself and adopt different business models and processes without any change in the 
congressional budget and oversight processes. Some minor adjustments from 
Congress would help, e.g., extending the obligation period for one-year 
appropriations to permit more realistic and efficient defense spending. However, 
overall, DOD alone can operate a long-range resource management system of its 
own design as long as it still translates the outputs into formats acceptable to 
Congress (as it does with annual appropriation legislation). DOD does this now with 
is existing acquisition, procurement and PPBES processes, e.g., in use of the 
milestone authority decision process and cross-walking from program to PEs to 
appropriations formats. We argue that it is incumbent on DOD leadership to 
demonstrate to Congress how the Department can operate more effectively and 
efficiently rather than to depend on congressional and GAO oversight to determine 
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Conclusions 
DOD could operate more efficiently (similar to multinational corporations), but 
it is hamstrung by bureaucratic inefficiency and multiple layers of over-lapping 
managerial and political control. From our perspective, the question of reform is one 
of how to structure and operate the organization so as to better match capability with 
mission.  
In our view, the defense acquisition decision process is so excessively 
bureaucratic that, as with the PPBES process, it should be completely replaced by a 
new process. This new process would enable capital asset investment analysis of 
alternatives, decision-making and execution in a much shorter period of time, 
involving far fewer participants, and in synchronicity with a long-range planning and 
accrual budgeting process that places emphasis on performance rather than input 
and process variables. Both the DAS and PPBES processes, as they operate 
presently, are an incredible and wasteful triumph of process over substance. We 
believe that if we really intend to run DOD as a business (i.e., using smart business 
practices), the best way to accomplish this goal is, literally, to make it a business—
through privatization of what we perceive as essentially non-governmental functions 
performed in the DOD acquisition process to the private sector. In our view, much of 
what the DOD acquisition and contracting bureaucracy does presently, sometimes 
well but sometimes very badly, could and should be performed entirely outside of 
government.  
Part of the reform problem is alleged to be "politics"—i.e., having to operate 
under the constraints of a democratic political system. But, in fact, free and 
democratic political systems force compromise under a high degree of transparency. 
Democracy is, in fact, ugly and slow at times, but it beats other political systems in 
the long run in terms of mission and financing choice—but not production of the 
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Here is where DOD has the obligation to lead political leaders in the right 
direction. But, what do we do instead? We organize and operate under the 
constraints of a highly inflexible, slow, torpid bureaucracy and blame the design and 
constraints on the political system, Yet, in fact, the problem lies far more with DOD 
structure and resistance to operating in markets as a free buyer and seller. And, in 
light of the purpose of this study, we fail in essence to take much or any advantage 
of the worldwide market in defense assets.  To be sure, the problem of moving to 
more open buying of defense assets and of buying rather than making is both 
political and organizational. However, we argue that politics follows rather than leads 
in the definition of better structural/organizational fit to mission and market dynamics. 
The critical question is whether DOD leadership is willing to take the risks associated 
with competitive-market-oriented reform and privatization of non-core functions that 
require adoption of a radically different business model.  
We also observe that where the production of privately consumed goods and 
services is concerned, private organizations are usually more efficient than state-
owned enterprises. We assert that the same is true, for reasons explained by 
economics, for production of assets needed by DOD. Consequently, DOD should 
increase its reliance on the private sector worldwide in the acquisition of warfighting 
capital assets. Also, we noted that the reduced cost of information should increase 
the efficacy of markets relative to organizations and of non-governmental 
organizations relative to government. Improved communications technology, 
logistics, and IT all have reduced the cost of information, and have thus increased 
efficiency in the private sector. Value chain analysis is needed to make significant 
improvement in DOD acquisition and resource management, and implementation of 
the results of such analysis will require: implementation of more rigorous business 
process reengineering and reduction in the workforce size and scope of work 
demanded of the existing DOD acquisition and resource management bureaucracy. 
DOD can take advantage of the same methods used by private industry to increase 
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we argue that it could use a more competitive market strategy and buy from the 
international marketplace to the greatest extent possible. 
We also have asserted that there is little reason to question the pace of 
change and contingency in the cultures and environments within which DOD must 
operate, or the fact that DOD must respond to such change. We believe that not all 
such transformation will involve evolution towards organizational net centricity and 
replacement of bureaucracy with hyperarchy (where appropriate and feasible; see 
Jones & Thompson, 2007). More moderate adjustments to change are far more 
likely to be made before such bureaucratic organizations consider radical 
reformulation of their design, structure and modes of operating internally and in 
conjunction with other organizational entities. However, we have provided support 
for the argument that as a result of threat and other environmental changes and 
increased contingency, some movement towards hyperarchic design and netcentric 
operation is inevitable if DOD is to become more responsive and better able to 
accomplish its primary mission in the 21st Century. As threats change, so must the 
national defense organizations that develop the capabilities to meet the demands of 
these new environmental threats and international security circumstances. 
We accept that comprehensive reform for both resource management 
systems (including PPBES) and the defense acquisition process may not be 
politically feasible presently; therefore, we advance a marginal adjustment strategy 
using capital budgeting and radical reengineering of DOD acquisition, procurement, 
contracting and resource management as the more feasible option until the political 
climate is ready for more comprehensive change. And, in fact, both capital budgeting 
and reengineering may be reevaluated at the same time as DOD continues to 
experiment with global and open market acquisition of COTS platforms, systems and 
equipment. In this regard, the internal DOD business process reforms we advance 
are complementary to what we advise for DOD externally: to take greater advantage 
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